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My contention for many years has been that theological 
problems are first, and principally philosophical problems and 
need to be addressed as such. I began forming this view during my 
undergraduate years when I studied philosophy and was introduced 
to the theological perspective of George Tyrrell (1861–1909). 
Further, the philosophical perspective of one of my professors at St 
Michael’s College, University of Toronto, Leslie Dewart (1922–
2009); contributed significantly to the formation of my 
convictions. Dewart’s understanding of “dehellenization,” a 
philosophical concept which is not to be confused with the 
negative concept of “unhellenization,” provided an intellectual 
opportunity for fresh reflection on my inherited classical 
understanding which was presenting problems for me. Through an 
examination and review of their writings, I connected the thought 
of George Tyrrell and Leslie Dewart. I then contrasted their 
thoughts with my classical understanding. I continue these efforts 
which disclose fresh insights in philosophical and theological 
thought. I do this to aid the quest of the contemporary seeker of 
wisdom and I leave it to the reader to decide whether or not my 
reflections have clarified the issues or clouded them. 
It is unfortunate that, at this time in the development of 
religious ideas in the Western context, the place of philosophy in 




relation to theology seems to have been usurped to a great extent 
by sociology and psychology. And I am sure that contemporary 
theologians are the poorer for it. That having been said, it is my 
hope that those readers who may not be philosophically inclined, 
but favour sociology and psychology, will uncover insights not 
previously realized, should they persevere with this book. First, 
however, I make a brief remark about the “scientific philosophy” 
that is endorsed in this book. To my mind, science is not to be 
confused with technology, nor philosophy. I hold that a scientific 
philosophy is a reasoned philosophy, but one that is not necessarily 
rooted in Greek classical thought. A scientific philosophy may be 
contrasted to a scholastic philosophy which I find wanting in its 
ability to credibly support a contemporary theology.  
Many contemporary Western theologians are in the process of 
rethinking the role of theology in the public sphere and its 
subsequent influence in secular society. In the public sphere of 
secular society, where religious and spiritual ideas are often 
perceived as needless in a secular society, although they may be 
accepted privately as necessary, theological thinking is able to 
serve as a means for the proper integration of religious and 
spiritual ideas into the public sphere, without offence to its secular 
status. Admittedly, theological thinking, when aberrant, can serve 
as cause for division, fragmentation and disintegration within a 
society, thus giving offence to believer and non-believer alike. 
Today, in the Western world, a shift is taking place from the old 
style competitive theological polemics to a new style of 
cooperative ecumenical cooperation. This change in thinking is 
also happening on a global scale and in various non-Western 
cultures. Such change is reflected in that conventional theology, 
supported by classical philosophy, is shifting to discursive 
theology, supported by phenomenological philosophy. Further, 
contemporary theologians are seeking to make sense of the 
personal, but not necessarily private, experience of the believer. 
Making sense of the believer’s experience is often expressed in 
narrative terms, that is, through the telling of one’s personal story 
of belief or faith commitment. And many theologians have their 
own story to tell, including the convert George Tyrrell. 




In his day, and within his particular intellectual climate, 
George Tyrrell attempted to understand the human narrative 
through his own story of the experience and understanding of 
revelation. Being a theologian his preoccupation with revelation 
and the religious narrative became a primary focus in his life. His 
theological legacy has its roots in the Roman Catholic theological 
views that were in vogue in the early 20th century. Tyrrell’s way 
of thinking reflects an early ecumenical discursive model of 
theologizing rather than the conventional polemical model of 
theologizing current at the time. It is in this discursive model of 
theologizing, I suggest, that one finds Tyrell’s creative and 
insightful contribution to the understanding of his faith. Further, 
his creative and insight contributions may enlighten the faith of 
others. 
This book is intended to draw the reader’s attention to the fact 
that many creative and insightful contributions from theologians 
are often quoted and discussed by academics and others. These 
critics truly believe they have understood and correctly expounded 
the ideas of such insightful and innovative thinkers. And in most 
cases, they probably have done so, but not always. To my mind, 
George Tyrrell’s story of creative and innovative theologizing is a 
case in point. The appreciation of his style of creative and 
innovative thinking is not as well established as it could be among 
those seeking religious enlightenment. The majority of academics 
discuss Tyrrell from an historical perspective within the (so-called) 
Modernist Crisis in the Roman Catholic Church. The extensive 
bibliographies in M. J. Weaver (1981) and D. Wells (1981) support 
this observation. 1 However, David Schultenover (1981) focuses on 
a different historical understanding than that of the conventional 
one. Schultenover writes of Tyrrell’s way of thinking that 
its genre is intellectual history as distinguished from 
institutional history…[and] it aims to describe not the 
“modernist movement” but the intellectual development of 
a major contributor to the “movement” by focusing on the 
man as the key to his thought. 2 
From Schultenover’s perspective, then, I focus on Tyrrell’s 
intellectual development as expressed in the Prefaces of his books. 




In the Preface of a book an author often says what he said he said 
in developing the main thrust of the argument. Through a critical 
reading of the Preface, readers can encounter that personality 
whose ideas they may come to appreciate and whose influence 
they respect.  
Therefore, to my mind readers can discover Tyrrell’s 
intellectually meditative character by reading the Prefaces of his 
books. So, after a brief outline of his books expressed in the 
Prefaces, I offer a personal commentary as to the affect his 
writings have had on my thinking. Prior to that however, a brief 
synopsis of the particular intellectual climate of Tyrrell’s day will 
help in appreciating the context which formed his particular 
meditative character. 
 
Particular Intellectual Influences In George Tyrrell’s Life 
 
Tyrrell lived “at a time when religion seemed fated to be 
submerged and undermined by the vast torrent of secular 
knowledge that was sweeping over the intellectual world.” 3 This 
torrent of secular knowledge threatened to discount the intellectual 
meditative approach to religious experience. This threat was 
common to the intellectual worlds of the British Isles and the 
Continent. David Wells notes that Tyrrell displayed in is writings 
an Irish heart but he had a German mind which characterized him 
as straddling both worlds. Mary Green suggests that in Tyrrell’s 
day “Catholic religious thought had not kept pace with English 
religious thought in general, whether sound or poor, nor with 
Catholic and general religious thought in most countries on the 
Continent.” 4 Of German intellectual meditative thinking, which 
influenced Tyrrell somewhat, Joseph Gostwick notes that it had as 
its source earnest religious feelings which endeavoured to attain a 
unity of thought that could never be the result of knowledge 
founded on logical understanding alone. An earlier development in 
intellectual meditative thinking that Gostwick had observed, was 
that “the ‘rights’ of intuition and immediate feeling – these rights 
so long suppressed under the tyranny of logic – were now allowed 
to be as valid as the conclusions of reasoning processes.” 5 This 




validation nourished Tyrrell’s intellectually meditative character. 
And, “The Programme of Modernism,” initiated by the encyclical 
Pascendi Dominici Gregis of Pius X, provided a focus for Tyrrell’s 
provocative thinking. 
The philosophical system known as Scholasticism is a product 
of its own age and time. Tyrrell recognized that the synthesis it 
provided no longer met the needs of the modern and scientific age. 
He probed into religious experience and, with the aid of scientific 
thinking, desired to express his intellectual meditative 
understanding in a new frame of reference. In Leslie Lilley’s 
words Tyrrell could “no longer accept a demonstration of God 
supported by those ‘idols of the tribe’ – the Aristotelian 
conceptions of motion, of causality, of contingency, of finality.” 6 
Percy Gardner suggests that some knowledge of Hegel’s dialectical 
philosophy would help in understanding the context of Tyrrell’s 
thinking. Gardner quotes Tyrrell as saying, “The process through 
which I have reached my present position will appear as a 
wavering, rather than a straight line, a result that should facilitate 
the critic’s task.” 7 As well, Bernard Reardon acknowledges 
Hegel’s influence on Tyrrell’s thought.8 A contemporary of 
Tyrrell, Hakluyt Egerton, (pseudonym for Arthur Boutwood), 
alludes to the meditative aspect of Tyrrell’s thinking. When Tyrrell 
speaks of “Divine Immanence,” Egerton does not believe that 
Tyrrell means Pantheism, the doctrine that God is the substance of 
all finite particulars. Rather, Egerton writes, “Undoubtedly Father 
Tyrrell believes that God is in man – although by way of mere 
indwelling, or as a part of man’s composite nature, is not clear 
[author’s italics”].9 Egerton also notes that when Tyrrell 
distinguishes an ordinary experience of religion from an 
experience of revelation he does not refer to the objective source of 
the experience but refers to the experience itself by a description of 
its ‘subjective’ character, that is, to its character as a psychological 
happening. According to Maude Petre, in a lecture entitled, 
“Revelation and Experience,” Tyrrell wrote a response to Egerton 
in which he sets forth this distinction: “Faith and knowledge 
cannot be confronted, because their realms are not the same.” 10 




These, then, are the particular intellectual influences in and 
through which Tyrrell thought and wrote and which shaped his 
character. They also gave rise to a distinctive approach to theology 
which is evident in his thinking. 
 

















In the Introduction to her book, Letters from a “Modernist,” 
Mary Jo Weaver offers advice on how to approach Tyrrell’s letters. 
She encourages the reader to overcome the temptation to follow 
theories about Tyrrell by suggesting that “we ought to search 
Tyrrell himself for an understanding.” 11 I agree with her advice. 
Through the Prefaces and Introductions to his books, considered 
chronologically, I search Tyrrell’s thought to understand his 
meditative and contemplative character from which originated his 
creative and insightful thinking which in turn changed my 
theological point of view. 
 
Nova et Vetera: Informal Meditations 
Publication date: 1900 
 
The Preface to this book was written in 1897. Tyrrell presents 
these meditations informally and leaves the reader to supply any 
practical applications deemed necessary. The wisdom which arises 
within meditation is often hidden from the clever and prudent and 
revealed to little ones. Such wisdom “does not leave them as it 
finds them in their ignorance and littleness” but rather gives them 
understanding, he says. In Maude Petre’s assessment of this book 
she writes: 
The influence of this book can best be understood through a 
knowledge of the class of mind and soul to which it was 
primarily addressed. It was not written (or preached) 
mainly for the outside world; but rather for Catholics, and 
for Catholics earnest in the spiritual life. Many such had 
been trained to accept as inevitable a certain systematised 
form of prayer…and to many silent suffers in convents, but 
not convents only, the informal meditations of ‘Nova et 
Vetera’ came as a breath of fresh air into a close room.12 
These meditations are not presented in any particular order 
since Tyrrell saw no specific advantage to be gained by logical 
classification. He records them as they occurred from time to time, 




spontaneously and unsought for, and in no way as parts of a whole. 
He cautions the reader to be aware of the way understanding is 
expressed by those within the Church and those outside the 
Church. The intent may not be the same even though the 
vocabulary is identical. Despite the human emphasis in these 
meditations, Tyrrell assures his readers that “no one will be likely 
to find fault with them as neglecting to give due emphasis to the 
Divinity of our Saviour and to the mystical aspect of Catholic 
Christianity.” He concludes the Preface by stating that the purpose 
of the book is to start the spiritual stream running where it has 
gone dry. 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
A phenomenological philosophy discloses the practical, or 
ethical understanding of the presence of God in one’s experience, 
that is, phenomenological philosophy acts as a meditative 
philosophy. It is not how accurately we understand our meditations 
but, rather, how authentically we interpret them in practice. Such 
practical, or ethical, interpretation must be made in the context of 
the philosophical transitions currently taking place in Western 
culture and society. In Tyrrell’s way of thinking we can see the 
beginnings of a phenomenological philosophy, albeit, not fully 
understood, or known, even to Tyrrell himself. I realize also that 
not all scholars accept the phenomenological philosophical method 
as one that clarifies. To some scholars the method obscures more 
than clarifies. 
Theologians, who undertake a habit of meditation, come to 
understand that there is a unity composed of the meditating subject 
and the other, either an object, or another meditating subject. That 
is, their understanding recognizes the unity of the one meditating 
(the subject) with another (the object). In practice, meditation is 
still often plagued by scholasticism which introduced dichotomous 
thinking into the practice of meditation. Like many theologians 
today, Tyrrell began searching for new and meaningful ways to 
interpret his, and other’s religious experience through meditating 
on God, as revealed in Christ. Meditation, within Western religious 




experience, is not uniformly interpreted as Tyrrell noted in his 
writings. 
These various existential interpretations arising out of 
meditative contemplation may be presented phenomenologically. 
A phenomenological presentation is preferred because the classical 
theological presentation is decreasingly viable, thus less useful as 
Western culture becomes increasingly dehellenized. That is to say, 
Western culture is increasingly independent of ancient Greek 
philosophical concepts. The defects of scholasticism, as Tyrell 
came to understand, are the defects of its time and of the 
philosophical language of the day. Even a revised form of 
scholasticism, were such a perspective possible, could not 
construct the equivalent of a phenomenological interpretation of 
experience. A phenomenological interpretation of the meditative 
experience is a non-dichotomous understanding of how we 
conceive ourselves in the world. On the contrary, classical 
speculative interpretation introduces a dichotomous understanding. 
A phenomenological meditation attempts to understand the 
existential context and develops a set of intersubjective norms and 
values. Tyrrell saw this clearly and called upon the reader of 
Meditations to supply practical applications of his or her insight 
accordingly. In the contemporary Western context, formal 
investigative theology is changing as Tyrrell had suggested. That is 
to say, religious institutions and customs are no longer perceived 
as given from on high as once was the case. Institutions and 
customs arise from experience, that is, they are not exclusively 
hereditary. As well, the number of theologians accepting that no 
one force external to experience determines the affairs in this life, 
is increasing. The philosophical problem is that theologians of the 
classical school cannot accommodate the transcendent within the 
immanent without being accused of being pantheistic. 
Any philosophy can provide some degree of satisfaction in 
religious interpretation and understanding. However, Tyrrell’s 
writings hint at a preference for the phenomenological 
understanding that was beginning at the turn of the century and 
which continues to gain acceptance in the West. In short, a result is 
that many contemporary theologians realize that human 




understanding, arising from meditation, takes place in an 
existential unity of culture and society, dand not within a 






Tyrrell’s grave, Parish Churchyard, Storrington, as photographed 
by the author in 2000 
 





External Religion: Its Use and Abuse 
Publication date: 1901 
 
In this book, Tyrrell directs his lectures towards practice rather 
than speculation. He acknowledges that the Catholic and Protestant 
religion are animated by the same spirit that characterizes the 
whole of religious experience. Practice is to be preferred to theory 
in pastoral interpretation. This is so since there is potential for 
abuse in addressing controversial issues when individuals 
theoretically “first fix their beliefs, and then fabricate reasons in 
support of them.” By practising one’s beliefs one achieves a better 
understanding than by speculating about them. We are reminded 
that religion is an experiential interpretation of our in-born 
instincts and appetites, originally known unconsciously, but which 
are brought to our consciousness by Christ. In this book Tyrrell is 
writing with the British public in mind and his intent is to “let 
Truth appear, and then bid men, ‘Come and see!’ And of these, 
some will remain and some will go away, according to the power 
of seeing they bring with them.” Whatever manner an individual 
uses to apprehend the truth that same manner must be susceptible 
to the understanding of others. 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
Natural theistic theology, as a discipline in its own right, 
leading to the practice of religion, lies outside the Catholic 
religious tradition. This is so since Catholic theologians regard 
natural theistic theology more as a philosophy than a theology. In 
fact, some theologians have never considered that natural theology 
had a proper responsibility to interpret revelation. Natural 
theology, an as epistemology, is the philosopher’s proper way of 
inquiring into created knowledge, not revelation. Natural theistic 
theology operates outside revelation, that is, within the created 
order and interpreting the created order. The sensus fidelium, that 
is, the lived sense of the faithful, is concerned with the Church’s 
revealed life. Theologians are required to interpret life revealed 




within the sensus fidelium. Yet, even in serving in this role 
theologians are not central to the church’s spiritual life. However, 
they are essential to the church’s development of doctrine. In short, 
the Church could get along without theologians, but it could not 
get along without the sensus fidelium; the sensus fidelium being an 
expression of the lived faith, or the practice of the faith in the 
presence of the Holy Spirit. Two factors are required for the sensus 
fidelium to develop properly; one, the engagement of theologians 
themselves and two, the Magisterium, that is, the collective 
teaching authority of the Church. Together they are able to counter 
any abuse of religion. 





The Faith of the Millions (First Series Chapters I – XII; Second 
Series Chapters XIII – XXII) 
Publication date: 1902 
 
In the Preface to this book of meditations Tyrrell acknowledges 
the difference in expression between English and Continental 
Catholicism. Further, he acknowledges that these meditations may 
also be understood from a different theological perspective by 
English and Continental readers. However, what English and 
Continental Catholicism share in common is that “religion must 
not only satisfy and equal [felt needs], but must transcend and 
promise to expand indefinitely man’s higher spiritual capacities.” 
Through interpreting Christ’s teachings in this collection of 
meditations Tyrrell has come to realize that ignorance is less an 
obstacle to enlightened understanding than false learning and 
mental deficiencies are obstacles to enlightened understanding. 
Regarding the faith (of the millions), his understanding is that 
Christianity is not added to ‘complete’ human nature rather 
Christianity is inherent in human nature. 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
Within phenomenological understanding something other than 
mere intellectual change occurs. An essential change occurs. With 
phenomenological understanding there is a re-structuring in the 
approach to understanding the relationship between subject and 
object. In phenomenological understanding the object of 
consciousness is not the Platonic ideal of theoretical 
understanding. Rather, the object of consciousness is the 
recognition of intentionally, that is, subjective meaning. This 
subjective meaning does not depend upon external norms that 
present being or essence. Humans need not express their 
relationship with each other theoretically. This relation may be 
expressed phenomenologically that is, existentially through a 
process of differentiation within an experienced unity. In short, one 




may argue that the difference of expression is that of English and 
Continental philosophers. 
Phenomenological understanding, which characterizes 
Continental philosophers, is an act of self-awareness or 
consciousness conditioned by a particular culture and society. But 
no one particular expression of culture or a particular form of 
society is necessarily required to bring about a self-conscious 
understanding. In Western European theological interpretation 
Protestants generally accepted German philosophy, that is to say, 
philosophical positions that relied on Kant and Hegel; and 
Catholics, on the other hand, accepted the Latin or classical 
tradition of philosophy. The Roman Catholic acceptance of 
individual understanding of religious experience is reflected in the 
German approach. Given the contemporary interest in the 
individual, phenomenological philosophy has the potential to 
disclose the self-revelation, or the knowledge of subjects, such as 
ourselves. In that disclosure we meet someone similar to ourselves. 
A phenomenological understanding reflects a dynamic 
intersubjectivity. Such intersubjectivity brings about a self-
transformation in our understanding of religion. But, it must be 
recalled that this self-transformation is not the experience of 
metánoia by which one person changes to another’s way of 
thinking, or acting. Metánoia must be willfully sustained or else 
the individual risks a relapse to former ways. An act of religious 
self-transformation is not the accommodation of one’s will to that 
of another. Rather, it is an act of adjustment of relationships 
between knower and known. Self-transformation arises from 
experience and insight and not from theory. It is almost a truism of 
religious belief that when old gods die people do not generally turn 
to atheism. New gods are invented. However, they do not always 
prove satisfactory. 
What may prove satisfactory is the acceptance of a 
phenomenological philosophy in place of a classical one, which 
leads to new creative insights and relationships. We must create 
new patterns of thought to meet the challenge of our present 
experience. In short, Continental philosophy may displace the 
dominant English philosophy in Western religious interpretation. 




History shows that controversial issues in religion, which were 
introduced by the new scientific knowledge of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries into the American Church, were discussed at 
the pastoral or practical level. However, the same controversial 
issues, characterized by the Modernist Movement on the Continent 
and England, were contested at the level of philosophical and 
theoretical argument. The Continental and the English 
philosophers could not understand the non-metaphysical or 
practical language of the North American philosophers and 
theologians. Thus, they tended to look upon American thought as 
somewhat heretical. This view created a dichotomy between North 
American and Continental and English philosophical thought. It 
was the case in England and the Continent that liberal Catholics 
attempted to integrate the new scientific knowledge within the 
teaching authority of the Church. That is to say that the 
Modernists, for their part, attempted to reconcile the conflict 
between the Church and the new scientific knowledge by up-dating 
the meaning of doctrine, dogma and Church authority. 
For the French and Italian Modernists theological study was a 
natural activity that included a life of prayer. Many Modernist 
theologians accepted that a saintly life replaced the scholastic 
philosophical understanding of doctrine and dogma as the proper 
interpreter of revelation. As George Tyrrell reminds us elsewhere, 
“Theology is not the product of the spiritual life of the faithful, but 
of the intellectual life of the schools.” 13 In the time of Tyrrell there 
was a trend away from professional theologians serving the 
doctrinal and dogmatic needs of the Church. The new trend was to 
engage in a scientific religious philosophy and to develop a 
methodology to serve the existential needs of the individual in 
community. The trend was minimally successful but classical 
philosophy, which is rooted in scholasticism, has remained to a 
large degree the choice of the institutional church but not 
necessarily the choice of the sensus fidelium. 
Thus, the contemporary theologian must remain in close 
contact with the hopes and the anguish of his or her own age and 
employ that philosophy most suitable to the times and the 
experience of believers. It is highly doubtful that scholasticism 




remains the most suitable philosophy for the majority of the 
faithful. Only by remaining in close contact with the changing 
Christian tradition can the theologian speak to the faithful in a 
meaningful way. Today, there is need to establish a philosophy that 
will be suitable to address the expression of meaning arising from 
humanity-as-subject within creation, and not humanity-as-object of 
creation. That is to say that, humanity is not merely part of creation 
but humanity is a co-creator. 





The Church and the Future 
Publication date: 1903 
 
‘In my own inward history this book ends a painful process 
of necessary readjustment, and I feel as one who, after 
much uncertainty, has at last chosen a path that is clear, 
however difficult and uninviting in many ways.’ Thus 
Father Tyrrell wrote to a friend on June 27th, 1903, in 
regard to The Church and the Future, which he had printed 
privately under the pseudonym Hilaire Bourdon, and which 
was being circulated with great reserve and discretion. 
There was, during his literary career, a short period during 
which it was necessary that his advice to those in need 
should be anonymous or pseudonymous. 
Maude Petre wrote these words in the Introduction to the 1910 
edition of this book. Further, in her Autobiography and Life of 
George Tyrrell, she reproduces a letter Tyrrell wrote to Baron von 
Hügel in 1903 about a book he intended to call, Catholicism 
Revisited. 14 Tyrrell wrote: 
I regard the ‘Catholicising of Christianity’ as a per se result 
of the Spirit of Christ, and not as a perversion or accident; 
but I perceive in that ‘Catholicising’ process (as in the 
scriptures) a divine and a human, an inspired and an 
uninspired element; and I apply the quod semper, etc. test 
in a practical way sc, beliefs and institutions which are 
proved, experimentally, to foster the Christian spirit, ipso 
facto, are proved to be true to that spirit. And by the 
Christian spirit I mean that spirit which spoke from the 
beginning in the prophets and men of faith, and found its 
most docile organ in Christ, and which still speaks in the 
corporate life of the Church, so far as holiness is found 
there, i.e., I make the Saints and not the theologians the 
teachers of Christianity. The Spirit of Christ rather than 
Christ Himself is the creator of the Church – or rather of 
the whole organism of the pre- and post-Christian Church 




of which Christ is the bond, and of which no part, not even 
Christ, exhausts the possibilities. 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
In the contemporary religious climate, I detect a renewed 
interest in the individual as a person as the common subject of 
theology and of psychology. Faith arises within the innate striving 
for the need of humanitarian community feeling. By that I mean 
community feeling in Alfred Adler’s sense of 
Gemeinschaftsgefuehl. Adler’s psychological concept appropriate 
for theology, as I have written elsewhere.15 Tyrrell’s psychology 
reveals a “growth model” of personal development in contrast to a 
model of clinical pathological psychology which is designed to 
help the individual cope successfully with life. Crises, in the 
philosophical sense, may be addressed through Adler’s community 
feeling since they present a new set of problems and possibilities 
for personal growth outside the clinical context.  
Diramuid O’Murchu, a noted Catholic author in psychology, 
seems to have had a similar experience to Tyrrell. He writes: “My 
own faith journey includes many transitions in which new ways of 
understanding superseded those which previously seemed 
unalterable or, according to official teaching, could never change 
and therefore should never be abandoned.” 16 My experience has 
shown that the outcome of theistic theological reflection has an 
influence on the moral and social life of individuals in community. 
Further, history shows us that all substantial deepening of theistic 
theological understanding has been the work not of ecclesiastical 
officials, but of faithful individuals whose proper role, sometimes 
in opposition to ecclesiastical officials was to correct and modify 
the formal teaching of the Church. This modifying role of the 
faithful is in keeping with Auguste Sabatier’s thinking whose 
understanding is that it is not enough that theology makes clear the 
impotence of the old forms of religion; theology’s task is to create 
new forms for itself, he reminds his readers in his Religions of 
Authority and the Religion of the Spirit. 




Theistic theology and revelation act and react upon each other. 
Within this interaction, my experience has been that theistic 
theological interpretation develops within my intellectual 
understanding, whereas, revelation unfolds within my conscious 
experience. Growth and development occur naturally within the 
reaction of theology and revelation. The individual is not a static 
being. The believer experiences life, spiritually and dynamically, 
in a bodily incarnation and not merely as a disembodied spirit. This 
dynamic incarnation enables the believer to overcome obstacles 
and to achieve that which is good as a goal in life. 
Further, this incarnation affects health and well-being of the 
body. Interestingly, the non-believer will also lay claim in this life 
to a power that affects health and well-being of the body. In that 
case, however, the power of movement is often understood as a 
psychic activity rather than a spiritual activity. But this is not what 
Tyrrell has in mind.  
Religious individuals understand themselves as bearers of a 
moral will to be exercised within the community. The meaning 
they give to life varies from individual to individual. Meaning can 
arise from a healthy or unhealthy life-style. One’s health, or its 
absence, is recognized from the individual’s attitude to life. In a 
healthy individual meaning cannot be private but it is personal. As 
such, it must be communal. In fact, private meaning is no meaning 
at all. In this regard, although virtue is experienced personally it is, 
in fact, meaning for the community. The degree to which the 
community can share in the experience of each member establishes 
the degree of unity and health of the community and conversely 
the individual. In all humanistic religions we see such a 
phenomenon. 
But what to make of the difficult path of life for the Church as 
Tyrrell mentioned? Striving for a better life is a conscious activity 
moving towards a goal, one that we know and one that we hope 
for. Its path is composed of pain and sorrow; relief and joy. The 
ability to revise one’s goal as new data becomes available is an 
indication that our chosen path is becoming clearer, that is to say 
our path is open, to the transcendent, not closed. The transcendent 
is that element of the Catholicizing process that moves the person 




away from isolated independence to a spiritually understood 
interdependence between one subject and another, between God 
and the Church. Humans, who make up the Church, are connected 
to someone beyond themselves and recognize this spiritual element 
in their lives. 
Religious belief is tied to spirituality and may be understood as 
a sociological expression of the faith experience. We cannot 
separate religious belief from its social expression since every 
existential human expression has a sociological and psychological 
context through which it is both received and offered. In 
Christianity the specific sociological entity that mediates the faith 
has a particular name, the ecclesia. Exploring all the various 
understandings of the ecclesia has become a specialized discipline 
within theology – ecclesiology, that is, the study of the church. 
Differing interpretations of the scriptural texts and the political, 
philosophical, charismatic, and reform movements all have 
contributed to the Christian understanding of the ecclesia. From 
the phenomenological perspective, the ecclesia is not an ideology 
imposed on a group. Rather, the ecclesia is disclosed through the 
particularities of the group’s self-understanding of its own 
historical culture, tradition, and rites. There is a plurality of 
expression of the ecclesia corresponding to the plurality of cultures 
and people within the Church of Christ. This plurality is not a 
problematic, but it is a “sign of the times.” Debates abound in 
ecclesiology, while necessary and legitimate they are often 
apologetic in character rather than investigative of religious belief. 
In surveying the literature associated with religious belief, one very 
rarely comes across any apologetics for the justification of the 
various ecclesiologies that are extant within Christianity. 
Arguably, the only ecclesiology that religious belief presupposes is 
a Pauline ecclesiology. This notion of the Church, being a 
universal community of spirit-filled people renewed in mind and 
transcending national, ethnic and gender categorization, had its 
genesis in the writings of St Paul. 
Paul’s vision for the ecclesia is a universal and Christological 
solidarity in which there is no longer any opposition between male 
and female, Jew and Greek, slave and free (cf. Galatians 3:28). As 




a consequence of his conversion and personal interpretations of 
Christ’s mission, Paul read very different meanings into the Torah 
scriptures and therefore used scripture in surprising and subversive 
ways to argue for a new vision of the church. I direct the reader to 
the seminal work, The Apostle Paul: His Gospel before the 
Gospels, by Daniel J. Theron, to find a fresh approach to the life 
and writings of St Paul which are pivotal in understanding the 
genesis of the Church in the contemporary world.17 
The grafting of the Gentiles onto the root of Israel required 
Paul to execute a bold and unorthodox re-reading of scripture texts. 
For example, Paul subverts the story of Hagar, Sarah and their sons 
(Galatians 4:21-31) by interpreting it to mean that the 
uncircumcised are the children of the promise. Such an inclusion 
was not without controversy. One of the earliest ethical dilemmas 
recorded in the New Testament concerned the thorny issue of 
circumcision. The Council of Jerusalem, (as reported in Acts and 
Galatians), eventually exempted Gentile Christians from 
circumcision and full observance of the Torah. This was the new 
wine requiring new wineskins. This message has defined the 
church ever since. 
Most theologians think in medio ecclesia, that is, within the 
believing community. In the context of Roman Catholic 
Modernism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the theologian 
George Tyrrell exposed unconscious understandings of power that 
wrongly identified the medieval juridical institution with the 
experience of the faithful and the realization of the church. My 
reason for appealing to Tyrrell’s, The Church and the Future, is 
that his experience is sufficiently contemporary to be useful yet his 
ideas have been tested by history. Pre-modern society was not 
oriented to professionalism but to authoritarianism. Pyramidal 
order was authoritarianism’s form of organization, hierarchically 
structured for absolute rule and governance. Modern society and, 
to a degree, modern religious orientation are oriented toward 
professionalism. Bureaucratic rationalism is an organizational form 
democratically structured for management and governance. 
Postmodern organization is different however, in that it is 
oriented to the principle of creativity. Legitimate creative 




organization comes primarily from that charism which is at once 
social and spiritual thus providing the context for Christian 
theologians to think in medio ecclesia. For any serious dialogue to 
bear fruit, it should be acknowledged that our Western 
philosophical tools such as classical Thomism are ill-equipped to 
serve as an ancilla theologiea for a new theology, which must 
stress personal experience and qualitative understanding. Two 
postmodern academic developments closely allied are critical in 
giving some context to the current theological tensions and 
philosophical issues today. The first is a recognition that the period 
of medieval Christendom has come to a close, having left in its 
wake a material secularism that is a constituent part of 
contemporary Western culture. The other is the psychological 
conception of the person that has developed, as medieval 
Christendom ended, in place of the philosophical scholastic 
understanding. 
The very foundation of humanism, based on a pre-modern 
classical anthropology, is being questioned in postmodern 
thinking. What the most appropriate response is to this questioning 
presents itself as the theological question of our time. If speaking 
of God really means that we are at the same time saying something 
meaningful about ourselves, then talking about God in categories 
that belong to an earlier stage of humanity’s experience simply 
cannot be satisfactory. One of the criticisms of modernity is that it 
sets up a false confidence in rationality and science. Within a false 
confidence, rationality and science are understood as being able to 
convey the totality of existential experience given their ability to 
categorize. In contrast, plurality, subjectivity and intersubjectivity 
are considered to convey authentically, the existential experience 
in our contemporary culture. Postmodern understanding moves us 
away from an ontology that would put us in contact with an 
abstract entity derived from theoretical deduction. Postmodern 
understanding takes us toward an active engagement with life itself 
which will determine the Church of the future. The Church of the 
future, as an institution, ought not to impose any specific 
philosophical system that might frustrate any broad notion of 
Catholicity. 




In this commentary, I distinguish between speculative language 
and qualitative language. Speculative language belongs to classical 
philosophy, whereas qualitative language belongs to 
phenomenological philosophy. I suggest that the suffixes “-ism” 
and “-ity,” characterize classical and phenomenological language 
respectively, reflect this distinction. Funk and Wagnall’s Canadian 
College Dictionary defines “-ism” as a suffix attached to nouns to 
mean “a distinctive theory, doctrine, or system: usually used 
disparagingly;” and “-ity” is a suffix attached to nouns to mean a 
“state, condition, or quality.” The following pairs of terms, often 
used in discussions in philosophy and theology, illustrate this 
distinction further: spiritualism vs. spirituality, materialism vs. 
materiality, personalism vs. personality, humanism vs. humanity, 
nationalism vs. nationality, historicism vs. historicity, Catholicism 
vs. Catholicity, individualism vs. individuality, modernism vs. 
modernity, dualism vs. duality, rationalism vs. rationality, 
moralism vs. morality, and Deism vs. Deity. Usually, words ending 
in “-ity” reflect a phenomenological language, whereas words 
ending in “-ism” reflect a classical language. 
This book is a product of my reflection. It is not a history of 
religious thought. Nor is it written in the form of a traditional 
catechism as founded on the school of scholastic theology. Rather, 
it is a philosophical reflection intended to reconstruct pre-Vatican 
II theological ideas in light of phenomenological philosophical 
understanding. Although I examine issues from a Western Catholic 
philosophical point of view, my observations may be applied, inter 
alia, to the entire Western Christian social and pastoral tradition. 
My examination is undertaken from within the collective body of 
believers, that is, the Church. The Church must be the locus of my 
study since there is no divine guarantee attached to isolated inquiry 
in the Christian philosophical tradition. I do accept that there are 
limits to “Catholicism,” the traditional concept, but what of 
“Catholicity,” the phenomenological notion? It appears to me that 
Catholicism is limited by scholastic philosophy, whereas 
Catholicity is free from scholastic constraints. 
The exercise of private judgment, which characterized 
Protestant from Catholic theologians in Pre-Vatican II times, no 




longer accurately distinguishes Catholic from Protestant. The fact 
is that in the modern context both Protestants and Catholics 
exercise private judgment. As a convert to Roman Catholicism in 
the Victorian era, George Tyrrell noted that the Protestant believer 
accepts scripture as functioning as the supreme rule, whereas, the 
Catholic believer accepts the Church as functioning as the supreme 
rule. What unites their behaviour is that both Catholic and 
Protestant interpret these rules through an exercise of private 
judgment. It is to charismatic Christianity, as revealed in the New 
Testament, and not to the ecclesiastical institution of the time that 
the Protestant believer looks for the light of Christ. The Catholic 
believer, however, looks to a spirit-guided ecclesiastical institution, 
not to charismatic Christianity. Charismatic Christianity, of the 
type recorded in the New Testament, reflects a period of historical 
inspiration and enchantment. As long as conditions for inspiration 
and enchantment continued, as it is argued, there was no need for a 
formal organization that might hinder, as opposed to enable, the 
action of the spirit. A critical reading of the history of theology 
shows that scientific and historical advancement became a 
problem, not for the Church as is popularly supposed, but for the 
philosophy and the theology giving expression to revelation within 
the Church. Scientific and historical advancement are primarily an 
epistemological problem concerning philosophical and theological 
interpretation and only secondarily a problem concerning the faith 
of the members of the historical church, or, the ecclesia. More is 
said below about this distinction between the historical church and 
the ecclesia. Existential phenomenological philosophy, which has 
gained influence within Catholic philosophy since the Second 
Vatican Council, encourages historical criticism. The scriptures, as 
documents of revelation, are susceptible to the laws of textual 
criticism as is any historical document. In the case of the 
scriptures, textual criticism discloses the literary conventions of the 
era in which the scriptures were written. In this regard, George 
Tyrrell writes in The Church and the Future: 
We do not ask if Socrates really said what Plato puts into 
his mouth; but we may rationally ask: ‘Is Plato’s Socrates 
the true Socrates? Similarly, may we not perhaps be 




justified in asking: Did Christ do or say all that the Fourth 
Gospel ascribes to him?’ but only in asking: ‘Is the 
Johannine Christ the true Christ, a true resetting and 
idealisation of Christ? 
The scriptures were not written as chronological history and 
cannot be used as any sort of “proof-text” to establish Jesus’ 
divinity. In light of modern scriptural studies since 1900, I 
conclude, as did George Tyrrell, that the Christian scriptures by 
themselves are an insufficient basis for the scientific establishment 
of a single clear fulfilment of prophecy. Further, the New 
Testament has been both consciously and unconsciously doctored 
into an agreement with prophecy so as to bring home to the Jews 
an ad hominem argument for Christ’s Messiahship (Sagovsky, 
1990). Further, referencing the Council of Florence (1431-1438), 
George Tyrrell noted that since then all that was taught about 
dogmas, sacraments and Church government from the Roman 
Catholic point of view was accepted as fully known to Peter and 
his successors. This pre-Vatican II view, which he criticized, is no 
longer tenable given the contemporary and ecumenical theological 
investigations. I reject this theological point of view, supported by 
the Council of Florence, and rely instead on the theological 
insights, typical of George Tyrrell, as I examine the move from a 
scholastic to a phenomenological philosophical understanding. In 
short, I contemplate the move towards Catholicity, characteristic of 
theological understanding after Vatican II, and away from 
Catholicism. It was evident to George Tyrrell that the historical 
criticism of the late 1800’s revealed that ecclesiastical government 
had developed de facto from a loose federation of organized 
democratic communities into a centralized and hierarchical 
ecclesiastical structure in which all the teaching authority was 
being invested in the pope. It appeared that the teaching authority 
would be taken away from the ecumenical councils and episcopate 
in which it previously resided. Tyrrell observed that the schoolmen 
of the day equated faith with theological orthodoxy and they 
assumed that Christ’s mission was primarily a theological one. 
These schoolmen argued that the Church must necessarily possess 
the same authority, which Christ possessed in settling doubts about 




his teaching and miracles on earth. Ignoring biblical inspiration 
such a view of the Church’s authority as held by the schoolmen 
can only be maintained through a philosophical dialectic, (dare I 
say rhetoric?), and papal infallibility. 
According to Tyrrell, in the Johannine and Pauline writings the 
first beginnings of philosophical reflection on the teaching of 
Christ are clearly evident. However, it is to be noted that Johannine 
and Pauline reflection and teaching were proper to their culture, 
and not to that of the Western scholastic tradition, nor to our 
contemporary culture. The Catholic theological system, in 
principle, is as old as the first epistle of St Clement, (circa 75–
110), in which the Church is conceived as a divine institution. It is 
conceived as a corporation possessing officers whose duty is 
independent of their personal gifts and determined solely by an 
official position. From this point of view clergy are analogous to 
officers of the state. 
That the institutional form was absolutely necessary for the 
saving of Christianity from speedy disintegration no one will deny; 
but it is in asserting the Divine origin of the Ecclesiastical Polity 
and of the Civitas Dei that Catholicism is at one with St Clement, 
and at variance with the critics, says Tyrrell in this book. What 
have the contemporary critics to say about Catholicity, not 
Catholicism, and the institutional form of Christianity, I ask. Given 
my understanding, which is patterned on the textual criticism of 
scripture, I suggest that the Christ would never contemplate God’s 
grace attaching to any form of government, ecclesiastical or state, 
in lieu of the person. Further, it is clear that the apostles believed 
that the end of the world would occur within their lifetime and 
made no provision for an institutional future particularity as we 
know and live it today. 
The spirit that animates the Church today, animated the Christ. 
To my mind, this same spirit reveals an understanding of 
Catholicity, not Catholicism, as constituting the Church today. As 
Tyrrell expressed it; Christ and the Church are different and 
complementary organs of the spirit’s own expression adapted to 
different phases of the same movement. I suggest that Tyrrell’s 
thinking discloses an understanding of Catholicity, rather than that 




of Catholicism, even though he writes with the classical 
vocabulary of the Catholicism of his day. The ecclesiastical 
institution is designed to perpetuate and promote, among the 
uninspired millions of believers, the conceptions and ideals 
revealed by the founder of the Christian movement, that is, Jesus 
of Nazareth. According to the Church’s teaching authority the 
institution embodies a variation of the original revelation and never 
creates a new revelation. 
A challenging philosophical variation, within contemporary 
theology, is the notion of homo faber vs. that of homo creator. If 
normative revelation ceased with the death of the last apostle, how 
Catholicity differs from Catholicism becomes a significant 
question. Catholicity is primarily a way or manner of life based on 
the life of Jesus of Nazareth that has been committed to the 
guardianship of the Church. Catholicity is not a body of doctrine 
imparted to the Church about Jesus of Nazareth. In short, the spirit 
of the Christ, not Christology, has been revealed to the Church. 
And the spirit of Christ is susceptible to phenomenological 
interpretation in the ecclesial community. 
The Spirit of the Christ appropriates from a multitude of 
beliefs, theological, ethical, and historical, those that are most 
suitable for its own embodiment and adapts them to its present 
purposes. The Spirit of the Christ uses the knowledge at hand to 
develop public doctrine based on a human understanding. Given 
this end, then, the true teacher in the Church is the Spirit of the 
Christ, or the Holy Spirit, acting immediately in and through the 
whole body of the faithful both lay and ordained. In cooperation 
with the Spirit of the Christ, the teaching activity of the episcopate 
consists in dispensing to, and in gathering from, all the faithful. In 
dispensing to, and in gathering from all, the Magisterium acts with 
the authority of, and in the name of, the whole ecclesial 
community. 
Regarding the Thomistic approach to theology, which is 
characteristic of traditional and hierarchical Christianity, Aquinas 
did leave a particular foundation to posterity. He left his 
theological Summa but he did not leave his inquisitive theological 
spirit, that is, his gifted insight into what was going on in the minds 




of those around him. His liberal theological spirit, in appropriating 
the methods of criticism current in his day, seems to be lost to us. 
A theologian, such as Thomas, is one who speaks prompted by an 
inward spirit and is, in fact, a rarity. Any priest, or minister, can 
instruct us and tell us what the Church teaches and believes. In 
short, any priest or minister can be a catechist. In our day a sense 
of official instruction, which continues to dominate the 
institutional Church, threatens the charismatic spirit of the 
theologian. History and experience show that the spirit of Christ 
does work outside the official Church. Thus, one may be 
historically outside the official Constantinian Church, while not 
simultaneously outside the Church of Christ, which subsists in the 
Catholic Church. A phenomenological understanding of 
Catholicity, or the Spirit of Christ, discloses the theological 
variation of what Vatican II intended when it affirmed that the 
Church of Christ subsists in the Catholic Church (Lumen Gentium, 
para. 8). 
Within the philosophical circumstances of our time, that is, the 
evolutionary stage of philosophy in which we find ourselves, I 
examine the Church’s theology in light of the fact that a Hellenized 
philosophy no longer satisfactorily meets the needs of Christ’s 
faithful. I live in a new age of history as societal and cultural 
change continues throughout the entire world. Such societal and 
cultural change has philosophical and theological implications for 
me as one of Christ’s faithful. My faith tells me that I am to be 
saved as an individual person and that human society is to be 
renewed with in this same salvific process. The divine life in me is 
shared with others within the Church, that is, Christ’s other faithful 
members. In turn, the Church shares the faith with all humanity. 
Humanity searches for a better world but often does so without 
seeking a better philosophical explanation of its experience than 
the one it has inherited. From my experience, I know that an 
evolutionary concept of nature is in the process of replacing the 
static classical concept of nature. This presents new problems for 
philosophy and theology, which call for a new analysis. To my 
mind, the classical and historical solutions must be replaced by 
phenomenological philosophical solutions. Henri Bergson’s (1944) 




insightful notion is at work here. That is, evolution modifies and 
develops fully those philosophical and theological understandings 
which interpenetrate each other. Within society there is a sense that 
human beings are destined for a higher life. The destiny of a higher 
life, or higher purpose in life, originates in this world, not outside 
of this world.  
Humans are at the centre and summit of that life which extends 
beyond the incarnated boundaries of human misery, that is, to the 
transcendental life. Out of the history of Israel, and here I mean the 
history that is understood by the German, heilige geschichte, or 
salvation history, has come the realization of the Church as 
theological mystery. In her incarnated historical life, the church 
grows into maturity and longs for a kingdom inaugurated by the 
mystery of the incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth. In the incarnated 
life, through the sacraments, the faithful are united to Christ, and to 
each other, within the Church. Christ established his community 
existentially as a society of faith, hope and charity on earth. And he 
did so without any historical or political governing structure. Such 
political and historical structures developed subsequently to his 
preaching. Such is the theological mystery of the kerygma of 
Christ. The phenomenological body of Christ and the 
phenomenological salvific community together constitute the 
mystery of the Church in one organic unity. Theologians today, 
then, work with the methods of philosophical phenomenology to 
establish the credibility of this unity for contemporary and future 
generations. To establish this credibility for contemporary and 
future generations, freedom of philosophical inquiry into the 
theological mystery of the ecclesia is a matter of necessity. 
The Church, or better, the ecclesia, is composed of individuals 
constituting a relational bond among all the faithful. This bond is 
the locus of the divine life in the world. For the Christian, it is the 
spirit of the risen Christ who forms this bond and calls all the 
faithful to him forming a new people of God, not according to the 
flesh, but according to the Spirit (1 Cor. 11:25). “According to the 
flesh” signifies the historically constituted People of God, whereas 
“according to the spirit” signifies a phenomenologically disclosed 
People of God. In other words, the ecclesia has evolved, and is 




evolving, in our understanding from an existential historical entity 
in time to a phenomenological entity in consciousness. The 
existential mission of the ecclesia is primarily salvific, and 
secondarily, political, economic or social. The salvific mission of 
the ecclesia is not connected to any one particular culture or 
philosophical system. It transcends history in its phenomenological 
presence, yet is mysteriously incarnated in history. By its nature 
and mission, the church is universal in that it is not committed to 
any one culture or to any political, economic or social system. 
Hence, it can be a very close bond between the communities of 
peoples and nations, provided they trust the church and guarantee 
its true freedom to carry out its mission (Flannery, 1996). In the 
phenomenological understanding of the constitution of the 
ecclesia, the priesthood of the faithful, and the hierarchical 
priesthood are organically related, but purposively distinguishable. 
These priestly offices differ ontologically and each is a particular 
conscious phenomenon. They constitute an organic, not 
mechanical, unified phenomenological entity. Collectively, all 
Christ’s faithful, lay and ordained are essentially a 
phenomenological universal entity when confessing matters of 
faith and morals. This confession is a consensus, or sensus 
fidelium, which originates in, and is maintained by, a 
phenomenologically understood presence of the spirit. 
Phenomenologically understood, then, Christ’s faithful as the 
People of God, the ecclesia, transcend the historical Constantinian 
People of God, that is, the ecclesiastical, not ecclesial, community. 
Constantine, it will be remembered, was the Roman Emperor, 
whose Edit of Milan (313) gave legal status to the Christians of the 
Empire. 
Within the course of my reflections, in preparing this book, 
major cultural changes have caused me to conceive of a new age in 
human history. In this new age I recognized that I myself am an 
agent of some of these cultural changes that affect my 
understanding of the ecclesia. The realization of this status remains 
problematic after Vatican II, particularly for the Catholic faithful, 
who continue to discern the presence of God in the changes 
brought about through ressourcement and aggiornamento.18 One 




problem arising from ressourcement and aggiornamento is the 
recognition of the individual in the phenomenological ecclesia, vis 
à vis the incorporation of the individual into the visible 
ecclesiastical corporation. This incorporation was a concern for the 
theologians of Vatican II, which they managed to address to 
varying degrees of satisfaction. The Council maintained that the 
individual person who does not persevere in charity is not saved, 
even though incorporated into the church. Such people remain 
indeed in the bosom of the church, but only ‘bodily’ not ‘in their 
hearts’ (L.G. para. 14. Flannery, 1996). 
In most hierarchical churches, it is believed that the teaching of 
the bishops, under the inspiration of the spirit, governs Christ’s 
faithful. This teaching is realized through a three-fold relationship 
among the bishop, priest and deacon within God’s flock which has 
been committed to them by Christ. Catholicism is a readily 
recognizable example of this understanding of a religious 
corporation. Theologians subscribing to the Catholicity of the 
ecclesia understand that bishops alone are successors to the 
pastoral responsibilities given to the apostles. However, they share 
this responsibility through a delegation to the priest and deacon in 
a collegiate structure. Today, this structure is more adequately 
understood phenomenologically rather than in a Hellenized 
fashion. Given developments in New Testament textual criticism, 
contemporary Bishops have become inspired and motivated to 
present Christ’s teachings in a manner relevant to the needs of the 
times, as did the early presbyters of the Christian community. 
Hierarchically constituted churches, phenomenologically 
understood, enjoy an organic relationship among themselves, each 
community with its own liturgical, spiritual and theological 
patrimony. In a phenomenological understanding, when the Roman 
Pontiff makes infallible pronouncements it is not as a private 
person, but as one in whom the infallibility of the ecclesia is 
disclosed in a collegial manner. Therefore, such pronouncements 
present the deposit of the faith in such a way that no new public 
revelation, or addition to revelation, is requisite for salvation. 
The laity, which includes those who are in a religious, or 
vowed, state of life, constitute a portion of the ecclesia and are to 




be distinguished from the hierarchy. Many lay individuals seek a 
deeper knowledge of revelation and a deeper wisdom than they 
currently possess in order to be fulfilled in the ecclesia in the 
circumstances of the present day. With the hierarchy, the laity has 
its role to play in interpreting revelation. The laity are related to the 
hierarchy in an organic constitution of the ecclesia and collectively 
they constitute Christ’s faithful. All Christ’s faithful are called to 
holiness and to participate in the divine presence. Reflecting about 
religion, whether by hierarchy or laity, and as guided by God’s 
presence, I agree with M. D. Chenu’s description (1959). The 
theologian is an adult Christian who, taking cognizance of what he 
possesses, reflects upon it, analyses the complex content of his 
faith, builds it up, unifies it. As one of the new People of God my 
theistic theology becomes an acquired desire, a philosophical 
desire, for religious understanding, within my conscious 
movement-towards-God. In fact, I am a being destined-for-God. In 
this understanding my philosophical attitude, as pre-requisite, leads 
me to self-discovery, to seeing for myself and to doing for myself, 
as defined by God. Since I undertake my self-discovery within a 
believing Christian community I thus clarify my particular 
experience, as revealed to me in God’s presence, through 
intersubjectivity, wherein I participate in God’s mind and God 
participates in my mind. Such intersubjectivity discloses that God, 
as subject, is differentiated from me, another subject, as well 
differentiated from other faithful subjects. 
As a theologian, I can never complete my interpretive task. 
But, in this interpretive task I need to embrace a philosophy that 
will be suitable to giving theological expression to the true 
understanding of God’s revelation to the ecclesia. On the question 
of the true understanding in religion see the collection of essays by 
Daniel Guerrière (1990). The most appropriate philosophy for me, 
as I try to explicate what is known implicitly about God and 
revelation through my experience, is existential phenomenology. I 
therefore must remain in close contact with the hopes and anxieties 
of my own time. Only in such a context can Christian revelation 
speak to me in a properly meaningful way. Phenomenology makes 
it possible for me to reflect upon myself and revelation in a manner 




that is unthinkable and thus not possible within scholasticism. 
There is only one activity, phenomenologically understood, which 
affects me and allows me to realize the true meaning of God’s 
influence on me. That activity is love. Love allows for 
intersubjectivity. In short, love permits the other to be subject for 
me. In other words, the other, either an individual person or God, 
cannot be an object if loved by me. A phenomenological 
understanding of love, then, has a greater appropriateness for 
theology in the contemporary world than a philosophy of reason. A 
loving encounter of two human subjects effects a participation in 
transcendental reality, that is, in God as subject. When God-as-
subject, is the other, I participate in the fullness of transcendental 
reality. The subjectivity which constitutes me is brought about 
through the divine creative love affecting in me a desire to see 
God. My thinking here reflects that of St Augustine. “For you have 
made us for yourself and our heart is restless until its rests in 
you.”19 I cannot initiate this intersubjective relationship with God. 
I can only respond to God’s existential invitation to me. Such is the 
deeper wisdom arising out of revelation with which the faithful 
laity must be concerned with in the circumstances of our day. 
In the construction of the Church of the future, the question 
will arise: could our present cultural ecclesial communities lose 
their role in society if they are constituted territorially? I suggest 
that the answer is, no. Multilateral communities will be constituted 
phenomenologically and subsequently designated by another term 
than multilateral. Such communities, when phenomenologically 
recognized, will constitute humanitarian communities which will 
depend, unlike the Internet, on embodied individual and collective 
relationships. The development of non-territorial communities 
suggests to me that the cultural problems of religion, language, 
education, administration, etc., can be resolved within an ecclesial 
community that eliminates the idea of nationalism, or national 
sovereignty. I suggest that in a new order of organic church 
governance, the notions of co-ordination and cooperation will 
replace those of a sovereign and centralized national ideology, 
which has become no longer useful. This is so since the ecclesial 
principle of subsidiarity locates the power of the decision-making 




process in the hands of those affected by the decision-making 
process. In contrast, sovereign and centralized bureaucracies take 
power away from those affected by the decision-making process. 
To act locally and link up globally demonstrate the dynamic of an 
organic, non-territorial ecclesial order, that is, an order of 
governance, not government. Whether or not such governance is 
workable in all contemporary societies is an open question at this 
point. However, such governance seems to me more in keeping 
with my Christian notion of God’s kingdom that is not limited by 
physical territory  
It is likely that in the future there will be no universal canon 
law to govern the Church and regulate the life of the faithful, but 
only regional particular canon laws. In a phenomenologically 
constituted community the development of canon law will be a 
self-regulating exercise as the law emerges from both public and 
personal experience through the various interpretations given by 
the faithful. In future canon law there will likely be minimal penal 
sanctions and more opportunity for remedial action. That is to say, 
the constitution of canon law will be such that laws will not be in 
external conflict with one another but, rather, be corrective of 
innate personal and corporate behaviour. This understanding is 
consonant with the modern desire to present an equality of 
opportunity. However, there is no guarantee of an equality of 
outcome. 
In this commentary, I suggest that a phenomenologically 
understood ecclesial community reflects a new ecclesiology that is 
based upon the relationship within our collective experience, and 
not on the mere notion of territorialism. The option for the future 
governance of the Church I advocate, in contrast to the present 
traditional architectural structure, calls for a new organic 
ecclesiology, not merely territorially re-ordered but 
phenomenologically reconstituted. Such re-constitution requires, 
on a continual basis, a reappraisal of the development of my 
Christian theistic theology along with all members of the Christian 
community. 





Lex Orandi or Prayer and Creed 
Publication date 1903 
 
This book developed from an essay intended “for private 
circulation, with the title ‘Religion as a Factor of Life’ under the 
pseudonym Dr. Ernest Engels.” 20 Tyrrell assumes, in this work, 
that our spiritual nature develops within our religious sense which 
“furnishes an experimental criterion of belief.” In the human spirit 
there is a longing for the transcendent God, a longing that can 
never be satisfied. This bitter truth arises from experience. It is a 
difference of kind, not in degree, which leads to a life of solid 
value. He writes: “That we are dissatisfied, not only with what the 
Ideal gives us, but, by anticipation, with all it could ever possibly 
give us is proof that there is a higher love-power within us which 
must seek its object elsewhere.” Tyrrell notes that, one who seeks 
after that which is divine in life, “may give himself to God’s work, 
God’s will, God’s cause, and yet not give himself to God.” Tyrrell 
acknowledges an Augustinian perspective in his thinking and 
remarks that the finite is transfigured by an illuminating grace, 
encountered in experience. 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
I am living in a culture that has not been envisioned or brought 
about merely by one individual or by many individuals. Rather, my 
present culture is determined by many factors, physical, 
metaphysical, mental, human, and divine. Indeed, my present 
culture may even be over-determined by these factors. By that I 
mean no one factor can be held solely responsible for the direction 
of my cultural development. I am likely not to see my present 
situation as it develops until it is too late for me to significantly 
influence its direction. I must live within my inherited limitations. 
The truth is that my culture happens to me whether I like it or not. I 
cannot stop it. Yet, I am personally involved, even though 
minimally, in its transformation as it currently takes place. My 
present religious cultural context is that I live within the anxiety 




and tensions that accompany the end of conventional Western 
Christianity. But within this tension there are indications of a new 
beginning and a new future. As a Catholic Christian, therefore, I 
must contribute to this future within my faith community and in 
collaboration with all of the churches and other faith groups. 
In the West, soon after the Second World War, a shift in 
religious understanding in what is theologically sacred, and in what 
philosophically constitutes a person, took place. Significantly, this 
shift, which continues today signals a change in philosophical and, 
in particular, theistic theological thinking. The primacy of the 
collective continues to give way to the primacy of the individual. 
In the modern era the notion of the sacred is no longer based on a 
rural civilisation and monarchical society, which shaped the 
medieval church’s governing structures. The shape of the modern 
church’s governing structures is determined by industrial 
civilisation and democratic society. Given the contemporary 
governing structure of the Church those who are not adherents of 
the visible church may enjoy the social benefits of its mission, but 
they are not direct sharers in its spiritual life. This does not mean, 
however, that those outside the visible limits of the Church are not 
related to the Church, in some manner, even mysteriously. Further, 
it is sometimes argued, by theologians, that the true church, in each 
generation, may even be found with those who have been 
excommunicated from the actual visible Church. This view is not 
that unorthodox when we realize that the truth of the Church’s 
creed is to be tested by its practical value in promoting the spiritual 
life and growth in the understanding of the believer. In Western 
society at large, it seems to me, that a new form of theistic 
understanding is coming to birth. As I rejected the traditional form 
of theistic understanding I experienced that my faith became 
capable of rediscovering that source which gave inspiration to the 
writers of the sacred scriptures. 
Reflecting on the existential situation in which I found myself, 
I readily recognized, as a critical thinker, that Christianity has no 
cosmology of its own. And, unlike the Christian traditions, pagan 
religious traditions do have sacred cosmological mythologies and 
legends, which explain and interpret their understanding of 




religious experience. Yet, paganism has no fixed creed of belief 
embodying it understanding. Nor does paganism have among its 
public figures martyrs giving up their lives for a moral law, as is 
the case in Christian history. Christian liberal theology, within the 
Catholic tradition from 1789 – 1878, as dated by Hughes (1947), 
has for its subject the human experience and Christianity bases its 
reflections on the spirituality of the human inner experience 
contextualized by various cultures. In the case of Christian liberal 
theology, the historical and written records of the church are a 
secondary mode in the interpretation of religious experience.  
Theologians consult these written records of the church for 
orthodox interpretation. However, only primary reflection on the 
believer’s religious experience provides the true subject matter. 
Liberal Christian theology, which is the perspective from which I 
write, belongs to the category of human experience, not to the 
category of philosophical scholastic theology. In my encounter 
with God, as revealed in Jesus of Nazareth and, since I am an 
intelligent being I transcend the boundaries of my existence in such 
a way that I become more truly and authentically myself in the 
presence of God. At least, according to Henri Bergson (1944). This 
type of genuine encounter in which boundaries are transcended is 
not reserved to mystics. It can be part of my existential situation. 
This encounter is at the centre of my Christian life which is 
similarly available to all believers in the revelation of Jesus of 
Nazareth. In this encounter, I come to know the Christian God as I 
come to know any other person, that is, through mutual self-giving. 
God gives to me; I give to God. On my part, this encounter 
necessitates a distinction between philosophical and theological 
interpretation. Philosophical interpretation and theological 
interpretation of revelation differ. Philosophical interpretation 
approaches revelation as a cognitive possibility; whereas, 
theological interpretation attempts to explain the historicity of 
revelation as a salvific event. Note that I do not say the historicism 
of revelation, but the historicity of revelation. There are limits to 
the use of philosophy in my existential understanding of my 
encounter with God. As with any personal relationship, a personal 
encounter with God defies total objectivity. Meditation on the 




other hand, is a subjective experience of being-with, which 
transcends the conventions of my earthly existence. I cannot 
authentically know others unless I know them as persons, not as 
objects, and certainly not as virtual reality. God must be 
incorporated into my understanding of my self as a human person 
because should I take God out of that understanding I also take 
away that which makes me human. 
As a writer of prose I may compose a story of mystery and 
intrigue without being in an actual situation or context of mystery 
and intrigue. In writing prose, I have a certain freedom and 
creativity not permitted to the philosopher. The philosopher’s 
existential condition, the actual situation, determines philosophical 
thinking. Existential conditions, in fact, bring about a particular 
philosophical perspective. The poet, on the other hand, does not 
possess the literary freedom of the prose author, nor is the poet 
hampered by the existential restrictions of the philosopher. The 
poet transcends both. In short, I, as poet, am creating poetry, not 
manufacturing knowledge or cognition. Poetry reaches into the 
deeper constitution of my being and not just to my sense 
experience and reason. Poetry, as many of us have experienced, is 
able to evoke a deeper level of meaning than the merely conscious 
level of a rational interpretation. Such then, is the existential 
situation in which I find myself, as I write this book. And in it I 
must then make my Christian theological contribution as an 
individual in society. 
While it may be true that for many of our contemporaries God 
has died in the Western culture of the 19th century; God may yet 
return to our culture understood through the scientific use of new 
images and symbols. Interpreting these new mages and symbols is 
the task of the scientific religious philosopher. But, it is to be 
remembered that the task of the scientific religious philosopher is 
temporary. The interpretive task is temporary for the theologian 
also. Contemporary thinkers know, from their experience, that 
there is no final philosophy or theology. The work of the 
theologian today is conceived differently than in the days of the 
construction of the great theological systems. The contemporary 
task of the scientific religious philosopher is to make known the 




great abiding truths of rational belief to a new generation. The 
principle merit and usefulness of scientific religious philosophy, 
that is, of dehellenized philosophy, in theological interpretation is 










Hard Sayings: A Selection of Meditations and Studies 
Publication date 1904 
 
Tyrrell wrote the Introduction to this book in 1898. He 
assembled this group of meditations with the hope that “the unity 
of their effect” would be felt upon the reader’s mind. These 
meditations and conferences were written at various times over a 
number of years. Maude Petre describes this text as “clear proof 
and expression of the militantly orthodox phase through which he 
passed.” 21 In writing these meditations and studies he attempted to 
counter an excessive rationalizing of the principles of Catholic 
Christianity. He makes no claim to have succeeded. He reminds 
the reader that these meditations “will serve to bring to our mind 
all the meaning and expression of a face if only it be already 
familiar to us by experience.” Maude Petre’s assessment of 
Tyrrell’s effort reads: “The first object of these pages is, then, to 
make Catholics ‘appropriate’ that which they often content 
themselves to hold by mere inheritance.” 22 Where one meditation 
may be weak another may be strong, says Tyrell, but some image 
of the whole truth may shape itself in the mind of the spiritual 
pilgrim. He cautions against a narrow rationalism that would lead 
the seeker of wisdom “to apply the methods and criteria of the 
‘exact sciences’ to matters of a wholly different order, to be 
abhorrent of all that savours of mysticism.” Ultimate truths, 
concerned with the beginning and end of our existence, are set at 
the limit of our intellectual horizon yet our minds are made for 
understanding what lies between them. That is, we are made in 
order to understand the movements and processes that disclose 
these ultimate truths framing the beginning and end of our 
existence. It is not our human need that determines our faith in 
God, but rather, what God has done in Christ out of love for us that 
determines our faith in God, Tyrrell says that if true religion does 
not feed the mind’s craving for the mysterious, the wonderful, the 
supernatural, then the mind will feed “on the garbage of any 
superstition that is offered it.” But this is false mysticism, or self-
delusion, and “no more discredits the true mysticism of à Kempis 




or of St Teresa, than spiritualism discredits spirits or jugglery 
discredits the miracles of Christ.” 
Reason is to help us in spiritual matters encountered in the 
mutable circumstances of human life. The collection of 
meditations in Hard Sayings is to be understood as a type of 
disciplina arcani based on Jesus’ parables which for those who 
could not understand “would have been only to their ruin and not 
their resurrection,” says Tyrrell. He shares with us a truth that he 
has come to realize. That is, the human heart is moved by the 
ethical conceptions of the Catholic religion. That religion embraces 
the clear conviction that she alone knows what is in man, 
and holds the secrets of life’s problems; that she alone has 
balm for the healing of the nations; that she alone can 
answer firmly and infallibly what all are asking, with an 
answer harsh at first sounding, and austere, but on 
reflection kind and consolatory, and, like the ‘hard sayings’ 
of her Master, ‘full of grace and truth.’ 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
Christianity was born within the Hebraic culture. In the 
Hebrew scriptures, the world is presented as the field of 
humankind’s experience, the stage on which one’s work and 
destiny are played out. The human being is not interpreted in the 
light of the world, but the world is interpreted in the light of the 
human being. Sacred history is the major theme of Hebrew 
literature. Such history is not, as in Greek literature, the study of 
the past as a means of finding out eternal laws that govern all 
events. Rather, sacred history looks toward the future, to a divinely 
appointed goal. The culmination of history in Hebrew literature 
terminates in the notion of the Messiah. The hope for a Messiah is 
of ancient Hebrew origin and is one of the contributions of the 
Hebrew people to the world’s history. There are Messianic 
promises of a future in which God will create the people anew. The 
People of God must change their ways so that God can turn to 
them again. In Hebraic culture, and to some extent in Christian 
culture, it is not for human beings to reason why but to make their 




submission to God. Such acquiescence goes together with a 
confidence that God will redress the situation in the future. Jesus 
turned away from certain nationalistic interpretations of 
Messianism current at the time and offered an inner-directed, 
subjective interpretation of Messianism. Christianity’s dominant 
religious character is derived from its interaction with Greek 
culture. Greek culture in the centuries immediately prior to 
Christianity developed a definite form of mysticism. 
Greek mysticism came to mean a particular sort of 
philosophical understanding of the whole of reality in which the 
intellect, and especially the intuitive, faculties came into play. This 
understanding was known as Neoplatonism, and it had subsequent 
impact in the early centuries of the Christian era. A system of 
Christian mysticism developed out of the strains of Neoplatonism, 
which became one of the main foundations of mystical theology. 
Neoplatonism may be outlined as follows: 
a) The phenomenal world of matter and individual 
consciousness is only a partial reality. It is the 
manifestation of a Divine Ground in which all partial 
realities have their being. 
b) It is particular to the nature of the persons that not only 
can they have knowledge of this Divine Ground by 
inference, but also realize it by discursive reason, 
uniting in some way the knower and the known. The 
nature of the human person is not singular but dual. A 
person has not one but two selves. One is spiritual, the 
other material. The phenomenal ego, of which one is 
chiefly conscious and one tends to regard as the true 
self, is a non-phenomenal, eternal self, an inner person, 
the spirit, the spark of divinity. It is possible for a 
person, who so desires and is prepared to make the 
necessary effort, to identify with his or her true self and 
so with the Divine Ground, which is of the same or like 
nature. 
c) It is the chief end of earthly existence to discover and 
identify with one’s true self. By so doing, one will 
come to an intuitive knowledge of the Divine Ground 




and so apprehend Truth as it really is and not as it 
appears to be to our limited human perceptions. Not 
only that, one will enter into a state of being which has 
been understood as eternal life. 
The Messianic Judaic idea was foreign to the Greeks, but they 
were recognized as providing a philosophical foundation for the 
believing community. That foundation was an intellectual one. 
Consequently, a rapprochement occurred between the Judaic and 
Hellenistic worldviews. No longer was the immanent return of 
Jesus the locus of hope, but an interpretation of the inner life of the 
spirit, that is, mysticism began to develop in its stead. Christian 
theologians drew heavily on Greek philosophical ideas while 
distancing themselves from Greek religious mythology. The 
response of the early church to Greek paganism was to 
demythologize their religion. This meant proceeding in a more 
humanistic fashion while at the same time using Greek notions to 
articulate the mystery of their religious experience. 
It would be a mistake to present mystical theology as a strictly 
philosophical and intellectual pursuit. It was not understood as 
such by one of the earliest and most influential Neoplatonic 
Christian mystics, Augustine of Hippo (+371). Augustine’s 
contribution in shaping the inner-directed, existential, and 
psychological focus of Western mysticism lay in his awareness of 
the presence of God in the deepest level of human consciousness. 
While notions of religious feeling had entered into the earlier 
teachings of Evagrius (+399), Augustine’s deep personal 
experience surfaced as the troubled ground of the human spirit 
itself, often wrought with the desire for the communion with God, 
but equally bereft of the sense of that felt communion with God. 
According to Tyrrell’s way of thinking one may conclude that 
when absolute unitary being is experienced it is usually interpreted 
in theological terms as the unio mystica (mystical union). That is, 
there is a unity between the “I” and the “Other,” and the “self-
versus-Other” dichotomy, is obliterated. The “I” is not a 
continuous, fixed entity. The true self is not discerned in advance 
but discovered in “becoming.” The ultimate stage of human 




development is the mystical stage of religious belief. It is this stage 
that provides ultimate meaning and integration.  
Mystical experiences have long been the domain of spirituality, 
and spiritual theology continues to be well suited to address this 
dimension of the human person. In some circles it is maintained 
that traditional religions have outlived their usefulness and that 
they are no longer adaptive to modern technological society. 
Nonetheless, it is probably erroneous write off traditional religions 
as anachronistic. 





A Much Abused Letter 
Publication date 1906 
 
Originally, Tyrrell did not intend to make this letter public. 
However, he justifies its public presentation due to altered 
circumstances and says, “I am convinced that such a course will 
remove far more scandal than it will cause.” In the Introduction he 
explains his reasons for changing his mind. They are: 1) that the 
letter in question is founded on ideas written two or three years 
earlier, 2) that the letter can only be judged in light of its original 
context, not read in extracts, 3) that parts of the published letter 
were not written by him but he does agree with their contents. 
These parts, he maintains, resulted from adaptation to local 
circumstances. 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
It is often easier to do things differently than think of them in 
different terms. Phenomenological understanding brings to 
consciousness relationships that clearly change not only one’s 
outlook on life but also one’s actual living. At least two authors 
qualify as other minds which can confirm this. One author, Ernest 
Keen writes; 
while reading the proofs for [my] book, I have had a very 
sudden and powerful realization that once you take 
existentialism seriously, you accept face-on the idea that 
human beings are beings, living proactively and 
intentionally into the future, the whole business of reading 
books and of writing them becomes transformed. One is no 
longer comfortable with writing or thinking about the state 
of things, of life, or meaning, but one is thrown, bodily 
hurtled into the task of saying how we should, can, ought to 
become….The situation is, I now think, more complex and 
simpler than I had thought. It is a simple matter, in one 
sense, to take existentialism seriously. But it is frightfully 




complex in its implications as soon as one begins to do 
so.23 
The other author is Merold Westphal, who writes; 
my own experience has been that the religious life provides 
a thoroughly convincing example of this wisdom. Surely a 
major reason why I’ve spent more time in philosophy of 
religion than in philosophy of science or art is that I came 
to philosophy more familiar with religion than with science 
or art. But stopping to ask the simple question about 
something so familiar; What does it mean to be religious? 
has initiated a process of relearning to look at the world of 
religion. I haven’t ceased to be religious nor changed my 
religion; and yet the process has been anything but 
conservative. For I see so many things differently. At times 
the discovery has been exhilarating; at other times, 
personally painful. At the same time, I’ve been able to see 
students of every conceivable religious and non-religious 
attitude discover how such a simple question can open up 
avenues of understanding previously shut off by the 
familiarity of the subject matter.24 
Carrying Tyrrell’s hope a little further, Macmurray notes that 
there is a decline in religious influence and practice, and he hopes 
that some will take on the challenge such a decline offers. He 
writes: 
Such a decline betrays, and in turn intensifies, a growing 
insensitiveness to the personal aspects of life, and a 
growing indifference to personal values. Christianity in 
particular, is the exponent and the guardian of the personal, 
and the function of organized Christianity in our history has 
been to foster and maintain the personal life and to bear 
continuous witness, in symbol and doctrine, to the ultimacy 
of personal values. If this influence is removed or ceases to 
be effective, the awareness of personal issues will tend to 
be lost, in the pressure of functional pre-occupations, by all 
except those who are by nature specially sensitive to them. 
The sense of personal dignity as well as of personal 
unworthiness will atrophy, with the decline in habits of 




self-examination. Ideals of sanctity or holiness will begin to 
seem incomprehensible or even comical. Success will tend 
to become the criterion of rightness, and there will be 
spread through society a temper which is extraverted, 
pragmatic and merely objective, for which all problems are 
soluble by better organization.  In such conditions the 
religious impulses of men will attach themselves to the 
persons who wield political power, and will invest them 
with a personal authority over the life of the community 
and of its members. The state is then compelled to perform 
the functions of a church (for which by its nature it is 
radically unfitted) and its efforts to do so will produce, the 
more rapidly the more whole-hearted they are, a crisis of 
the personal. If we remember that history has brought us to 
a point where we must think of human society as a whole, 
and not limit our outlook to the confines of our own nation, 
there must be a few who will fail to recognize, whether 
they welcome it or recoil from it, that we are involved in 
such a crisis.25 
So it is in questioning our ideas, even though scandal may be 
caused, that we grow in consciousness and in right conduct. Often 
such a change on our part requires a painful justification to 
ourselves and others. 
 





Lex Credendi: A Sequel to Lex Orandi 
Publication date 1906 
 
Lex Credendi was intended primarily as a “practical devotion,” 
or pastoral theology and only secondarily as speculative theology. 
It is the purpose of theology to comment on revelation. Tyrrell 
acknowledged that the “heart has its reasons” but it also has its 
language. There is need to have some kind of dogmatic conception 
for religious expression, but at the same time in Tyrrell’s mind, the 
church is not a school to translate prophecy into the exact language 
of thought. Rather, prophetic language must be universal. Of this 
book Tyrrell writes: “It is not then directly as an expression of my 
own private judgment and spiritual orientation that I say the Credo, 
but as an expression of the Church’s collective Faith, which I 
desire to share and appropriate, and which I acknowledge as a rule 
or norm.” It is the substance of the Creed, not its form that Tyrrell 
shares with us in this work. He seeks to share an experience of the 
Giver, not the gift; an experience of the spirit of Christ, not the 
teachings of Christianity; an experience of a full life rather than the 
implications of a Christian life. 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
Philosophizing, resulting in formal human knowledge, is a 
natural human activity and is not be confused with revelation. 
However, no particular philosophy is required to qualify as 
thinking, but rather, all philosophy is certainly culturally 
influenced. Phenomenological understanding does not conform to 
a given system of knowledge or methodology. Phenomenological 
understanding is conscious understanding and can utilize any 
methodology. 
Theologians interpret and understand religious experience 
according to the epistemological norms of their period. As I have 
written elsewhere, “Thomas Aquinas, whose theoretical 
interpretations were greatly influenced by Aristotle, teaches that 
human knowledge comes through one’s native capacity to know 




and through one’s experience.” 26 However, commentators on 
Aquinas have written that he allowed for a knowledge by 
connaturality, that is, a knowledge of acquaintance similar to that 
of a lover and the one loved.27 The experience of an increasing 
number of Western theologians is that theology suffers from a 
reliance on theoretical epistemology in interpreting religious 
experience. They believe theology ought to undertake an 
existential approach and thus subscribe to an epistemology of 
being as opposed to an epistemology of knowing. A sense of the 
holy or sacred, as a prior condition for the meaningfulness of any 
form of theology, is a spiritual necessity. A phenomenological 
theological understanding of “practical devotion” does not re-
present things but presents presence actualizing that which is 
divine at this moment. This “presenting presence” is tantamount to 
being limited by the “other” and this allows an encounter with that 
which limits me, which includes God. This new style of thinking, 
which we must deliberately cultivate, discloses meaning in terms 
of concrete connections between people and the experiences that 
have religious significance for them. Understanding these 
connections comes through agreement and disagreement among 
individuals so that the truth of experience may be understood. This 
is not a natural attitude in the behaviour of the human mind. 
Rather, it is an acquired attitude. The natural attitude is to think 
uncritically, that is, the “what you see is what you get” acceptance 
of experience. This is the attitude of folklore and fable. The 
Hellenist Greeks introduced a critical self-reflective element into 
their thinking. They introduced theory, or a theoretical attitude into 
the process of human reflection. This shift in thinking occurred 
about the time of Socrates who lived circa 469-399 BCE. 
The capacity for reflective thinking has allowed a 
phenomenological philosophy to emerge from the human mind and 
has led us to conceive that God is not responsible for everything 
any more. We have our responsible role to take in the 
interpretation of revelation. This understanding allows us to 
conceive ourselves as co-responsible agents and co-creators of our 
culture and society. With this status, we are able to correctly work 
towards building the kingdom of God on earth that more faithfully 




reflects the revealed mind of God. The co-participation in divine 
creativity is the risk that God has taken with us which anticipates 
possible failure. This is perhaps why Tyrrell began his personal 
journey of faith from a phenomenological philosophical 
perspective. His phenomenological approach to theological 
interpretation is one of many and it is not exclusive, although it 
may be universal. The form of theological thinking may change, 
but not its revealed content. Brian Gaybba notes that “considering 
that theologians still differ about the precise nature of their 
discipline, it is not surprising that even two hundred years after its 
establishment as an academic subject there was no one universally 
accepted view of its nature.” 28 
A task of theology is to identify contemporary trends in the 
thinking of the faithful with respect to their understanding of God’s 
activity in the world even when those trends take us away from 
traditional understanding. 





Oil and Wine 
Publication date 1907 
 
In this book, Tyrrell acknowledge writing as one seeking the 
truth “not from on high, as a teacher, but as an inquirer on the same 
platform as my readers” and as one who is just as blind as they. He 
has faith that the Spirit of Truth and Righteousness gradually 
reveals itself to the seeker of wisdom and works out its fuller 
manifestation in the community, and not in the individual. Spiritual 
progress comes with many a personal rude awakening, and “it is 
not ‘private judgment’ if, when it has irresistibly declared itself, we 
prefer the sovereign and most universal to any subordinate rule or 
ruler.” Of the Christ revealed in the Gospel, Tyrrell believed: “His 
spirit is not so concentrated and confined in the institutional church 
as not to be also diffused throughout Christendom and throughout 
humanity, where faith may often be found of a kind unknown in 
Israel.” Concerning his thoughts in this book, Tyrrell remarks that 
as unauthorized as they may be these “manifestations of the word” 
are offered as oil and wine to bind up the wounds of the “half-
murdered wayfarer.” They are not offered as the “oil of 
consolation and the wine of spiritual stimulus.” 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
In the development of my Christian theism God’s existence is a 
matter of experiential fact, and not of necessity. That is, to exist 
necessarily, and to be present experientially are quite different 
understandings. God, as reality beyond the totality of being, is 
revealed not out of necessity but out of love, I suggest, following 
the mind of Brian Gaybba (1987). An emergent motivation, as it 
were, on God’s part, not an external cause, is the operative motive 
revealing God’s love to me. There is then, beyond the totality of all 
existing things, a presence present to me through my experience. 
When some other presence makes itself felt and makes me to be 
more than I would be, were I not exposed to its influence, my 
belief has then true foundation. To express this foundation requires 




an adequate philosophy, which in turn gives rise to the need for a 
corresponding theology. What needs to be proven to me is not that 
God objectively exists. Rather, what requires a demonstration for 
me, since it is not immediately obvious, is God’s presence to me. 
As a believer, as a philosopher and theologian, in what sense and 
with what consequences, God is present to me, I must determine 
philosophically and subsequently express theologically. 
Philosophically, my human way of being, my self and my 
personality are constituted by my consciousness, which uniquely 
signifies my self to me. Thus, for me to be a subject, that is a 
person, is to be an object to myself. I no longer understand my 
personality in relation to an external nature. In other words, my 
personality is a manifestation of my self, at any given stage in its 
evolution. Consciousness and the interpretation of my experience 
constitute my personality, which is the equivalent of my life and 
existence. As a person, I am a being who desires to evolve beyond 
my present self. However, if I as a Christian look at the world and 
understand nature through Hellenic eyes, I will find it necessary to 
look to the past and not beyond myself. In looking to the past I 
subsequently assert the power of God over me. Through Hellenist 
eyes and focused on the past, I remain a creature with no 
opportunity to evolve to a to a co-creator status. Greek philosophy 
has introduced a split into the ontological status of God and 
humanity leading to an epistemological dualism. 
Phenomenologically understood, the God beyond me does not 
have absolute power over me in the classical sense. Rather, God’s 
power is shared with me as a co-creator. Let me say, however, that 
nature does have its own natural causes independently of God’s 
purposes. The fundamental relation between God and me consists, 
not in a hierarchical relationship of power, but in the mutual 
presence of God and me in a conscious unity within creation 
wherein I become a co-creator, sharing divine power. As I 
dehellenize my Christian theism my faith is recast and the meaning 
of religion is expressed in terms that do not imply God’s absolute 
power over me, nor my inordinate submission to God. 
In recent times, as Western philosophy has diverged more and 
more from its Greek foundations the concept of the supernatural 




has lost its usefulness for my Christian theism. This is so since the 
mainstream of Catholic philosophy has remained Scholastic and 
therefore, somewhat unsympathetic to the contemporary scientific 
understanding of human nature. Thus, Catholic theology, 
especially the school of thought that has abandoned Scholasticism, 
increasingly turns to non-Christian and secular thought for support. 
This is the case also for the Teilhardians, that is, those 
philosophers committed to the views of Teilhard de Chardin 
(1881–1955) or those other thinkers whose philosophical or 
specialized disciplines were never dominated by scholasticism; 
disciplines such as, scriptural studies, archeology, anthropology, 
etc. Concerning my worship of God, it might be better expressed 
that I render myself present to the presence of God. I may render 
myself present to God in interior prayer, which sends no message 
to God, yet through which I receive God’s presence. Such interior 
prayer is grace. As well, I may worship in public ceremonies, 
which visibly and audibly unite my worship with others through a 
collective presence within the presence of the present God. In this 
context of worship, the concept of any transcendent supernatural is 
not a necessary part of my belief, if I conceive the founder of 
Christianity as Albert Nolan (1978) suggests.29 However, what is 
absolutely fundamental to my belief is the “Otherness” of the Spirit 
of God, which is perceived in the Christian doctrine of grace. As 
immanent in me, the Otherness of the Spirit of God is known as the 
gift, or grace, (donum), of God. However, the traditional view of 
grace continues to be understood as grace building upon nature and 
not as the gift of the presence of God. In the immanent 
philosophical perspective that is a phenomenological 
understanding nature ceases to be juxtaposed to grace. Nature and 
grace remain distinguishable only, but not separable. Nature 
reveals the grace of presence because that is how nature has been 
created. Nature and grace remain only distinguishable, but not 
separable. Nature reveals the grace of presence because that is how 
nature has been created. Nature is co-terminus with grace and I 
derive my nature from being existentially, not metaphysically, 
related to grace. Thus, grace, as God’s gift, is God’s perpetual 
presence to me. 




Contemporary theologians, both Eastern and Western, are 
beginning to realize that the structure of church government, which 
reflects traditional, classical theism, must change. Alexander 
Bogolepov (1963) has accurately noted that for practical 
considerations, ecclesiastical districts were established from the 
very beginning of the Christian era in conformity with the political 
division of the state, and under the Roman Empire the Christian 
assembly became a state church. The present ecclesiastical 
governing apparatus, based on territorial notions and not on God’s 
grace or divine charism, is an obstacle to the ecclesial governance 
of the church now and will be for the future. Such territorial 
notions often do not conform to our lived, that is, existential social 
conditions. Nor do they reflect God’s presence or charism. Further, 
it would be a theological error for theologians to promote the idea 
of a universal territorial super-church composed of all the faithful 
based merely on the philosophical notions of human political 
expediency. In this connection, we must remember that a universal 
humanity does not exist, but that individual humans do. Further, 
humanity, as a phenomenological notion, is expressed through a 
variety of individual philosophical, political and cultural patterns 
in which God is present. 
 





Through Scylla and Charybdis or the Old Theology and the 
New 
Publication date 1907 
 
In the Preface, Tyrrell expresses the hope that others, more 
skilled than himself, once the controversy over his ideas has 
subsided “may perhaps take them up and turn them to better 
account.” Of these individuals, Tyrrell writes: “We cannot sift 
them out from the mass, but there is always a minority, a saving 
leaven, whose judgment is in truth the judgment of God, and 
before whom we stand as before an invisible eye that watches and 
judges, condemns and acquits.” To my mind, Martin Thornton may 
be among this minority.30 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
In modern times, phenomenological, or continental philosophy, 
has slowly been replacing classical philosophy as the underpinning 
philosophy in much civilized human development. The Church, as 
a social institution, is an example of civilized human development. 
In parallel, various other civilized human organizations, such as 
governmental, financial and societal structures, are engaging in 
dialogue with each other on an international scale. Such civilized 
engagements affect the development of my Christian theism. A 
phenomenological philosophical interpretation does not describe 
the same phenomenon that a classical philosophical explanation 
does. The former includes my consciousness where the latter does 
not necessarily include it. This accounts for a different 
phenomenon being recognized within each philosophical 
perspective. Further, as a phenomenological philosopher and 
theologian, in my interpretations, 
I do not abandon my ideological origins in order to seek new 
perspectives. Rather, I engage my specific culture and 
demographic traditions to create a new meaningful philosophical 
understanding with a new focus to replace the old focus. Thus, a 
new understanding comes from my reflective experience, which 




arises out of my ideological origins. In contrast to this approach 
some contemporary philosophers and theologians, both Eastern 
and Western, seem to prefer a return to a perceived golden era in 
scholastic philosophical and theological understanding rather than 
develop new meaningful understandings from their experience. 
Falling into such temptation, some Latin theologians are 
abandoning the phenomenological orientation introduced by 
Vatican II. In a similar manner, some Orthodox theologians suffer 
from the same nostalgic desire for a perceived philosophical 
golden age with respect to their ecclesiastical traditions, which 
often tend to fossilize the teaching of the Fathers. 
It sometimes happens that particular local communities, which 
are culturally identifiable and unified with respect to their 
ecclesiologies, present themselves as universally valid models for 
all Christ’s faithful. This approach will fail in practice because any 
universal identity of the faithful cannot be that of a particular 
community. In fact, the faithful are cultureless as a universal 
identity. In short, there is no universal culture. Rather, individual 
communities of the faithful are uniquely identifiable as a culture, 
within a culture. Writing from a political perspective, Victor 
Segesvary (2003) lists particular identities that one may possess 
within a given culture. Such as; being a member of a cult, football 
club, or a literary circle. Within the community, an individual may 
embrace all or only a few such identities. However, Segesvary 
notes that an irresolvable problem comes to the fore only when one 
of the identities is a fundamentalist one and is linked to an ethnic 
group or nation, a religion, or a cultural community. According to 
his thinking if my ecclesial cultural identity is narrowly 
fundamentalist it presents an irresolvable problem with respect to 
the development of my Christian theism. Phenomenological 
philosophers and theologians do not accept that the Church can 
force the faithful into belief. The Western Church did attempt this, 
however, during the Spanish Inquisition when scholasticism 
dominated the Western Church’s thinking.  
The attempt failed. Nor could any universal Church 
government, through propaganda, impose a unified religious 
identity upon the faithful. Rather, a unified and true religious 




identity is achieved through the faithful participating in the 
decisions about their own affairs in the local parochial and cultural 
context. This religious identity achieved through participating in 
decisions requires a reduction of the universal legislation 
governing the faithful. Particular legislation must be the norm. 
Ecclesiastical government, in contrast to ecclesial governance, is a 
hierarchical bureaucracy and a totally impersonal way of 
determining and managing the affairs of the faithful either on a 
particular or universal level. Thus, all things being considered, and 
because I am one of the faithful, this bureaucratic crisis affects the 
development of my Christian theism. 
In late Modernity, rapid technological advances have increased 
the opportunities for bureaucratic control over the faithful who live 
in a secular and westernized culture. The Internet is a case in point. 
With the advent of the Internet a new ideology, (called virtual 
reality), not merely technology, is in the process of being 
developed with the assistance of rapid scientific advancement. 
Regretfully, at this point, virtual community often seems to suggest 
a negative ideology, potentially threatening the person. The 
Internet is a de-personalizing forum since it has no need for 
physical, that is, embodied contact among those who use the 
Internet. In the internet virtual community there is no possibility of 
a humanitarian incarnation such as constitutes existential physical 
human relationships. Virtual community is the simulated 
computerized version of existence, which presents many 
philosophical and theological challenges to our understanding as 
incarnated individuals. To my mind, a non-incarnated and 
technological relationship, misnamed as a virtual experience, 
cannot reflect any true human society or community since the 
simulation by the virtual decision-makers is not identical to the 
experience of actual persons. The inordinate and uncritical use of 
internet technology is likely to create, as it were, eventually 
incompetent, non-humanized, and “un-incarnated” individuals. 
However, on balance, the internet has been known to stimulate the 
human mind to develop its knowledge, whereas television, the 
other modern medium, has been known to dull the mind’s activity. 
In short, the internet turns my mind on and television turns my 




mind off. Both have their effect on the development of my 
Christian theism.  
The lack of competent, incarnated and humanized individuals, 
or personnel, formed merely within the virtual reality of the 
ideology of the Internet, subsequently causes a lack of competence 
within the Church’s theological teaching authority, the 
Magisterium. Non-humanized and un-incarnated individuals will 
influence the understanding of Christian theism accordingly. It is 
for this reason, then, that any hope on my part as a philosopher and 
theologian for government of a universal church, brought about 
solely through a virtual and technological means, is abandoned as 
unrealistic. And, dare I say it, such merely virtual technology 
should be also abandoned as non-human? Victor Segesvary (2003) 
reminds us that humanity, as a community of individuals, is too big 
an entity to be the bearer of a single shared culture. 
Yet, individual cultures do require a community as their bearer. 
In this respect, our contemporary cultural world is not that 
different from the world of ancient cultures. Although, many 
contemporary philosophers and theologians do suggest that 
Modernity is different from everything that has preceded it. As 
well, many contemporary thinkers suggest that modern humanity, 
the result of the evolutionary process, is an exceptional gift to the 










Medievalism: A Reply to Cardinal Mercier 
Publication date: 1909 [1994] 
 
This book lacks a Preface or Introduction. However, a 
Foreword for the book has been written by Gabriel Daly. He 
provides an historical and doctrinal perspective of the issues and 
the intellectual climate of the time that influenced Tyrrell’s 
thinking. Daly understands this book to be “a faithful reflection of 
[Tyrrell’s] most typical attitudes and convictions.” 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
There are three significant literary practices that may be 
identified in the Western tradition of interpretation; the allegorical 
interpretive approach of Greek fables, the Midrash of the Jews, and 
the grammar and rhetorical style emanating from Hellenist 
Alexandria. In the theological interpretative climate of Tyrrell’s 
day, a phenomenological approach was beginning to be evident if 
not already in place. Within three decades of Tyrrell’s death “the 
Société Thomiste met in Juvisy, France, to discuss the question of 
whether or not Catholics could adopt the phenomenological 
approach as presented by Husserl and Heidegger.” 31 Judging by 
the negative reaction to existential thinking as put for in Aeterni 
Patris the Magisterium believed that the church could not accept a 
phenomenological philosophical basis for its theology. At best, it 
might accept to up-date the language of its theology understanding. 
Classical philosophical structure conceives that which is divine as 
being somehow “out there,” whereas, the phenomenological 
philosophy of Husserl and the early Heidegger view that which is 
divine as somehow a constituent of our inner experience and not 
independent of it. I suggest that it is part of Tyrrell’s attitude and 
conviction that it is to the individual’s spiritual welfare to 
investigate the relationship brought to consciousness by a 
phenomenological philosophical understanding. 
Phenomenological understanding, recognizing relationships 
rather than theories, differs in degree, not in kind, from theoretical 




understanding. Both are human intellectual undertakings. 
Phenomenological philosophy is intentionally constructed, and 
deals with symbols, not with signs. Signs, unlike symbols, do not 
require an interpretation since they are “context neutral” and 
indicate a standard significance, regardless of context. Signs 
communicate a universal and fixed significance in any context. 
Presented through words or pictures, “stop” means “stop,” context 
notwithstanding. To the contrary, a symbol evokes nuanced 
meaning for the individual in picture or speech. In light of Tyrrell’s 
approach to theological thinking, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
that he would accept that phenomenology, as it has become a 
constituent of modern philosophy, is a roughly satisfying way of 











Christianity at the Crossroads 
Publication date 1909 [1963] 
 
The Foreword of this book was written by Alex Vidlar, the 
Introduction by Maude Petre and the Preface by Tyrrell. Vidlar 
notes that those who were influenced by Tyrrell acknowledged that 
“they had found that he had a rare gift for interpreting the Christian 
faith and for illuminating the spiritual life.” Maude Petre speaks of 
Tyrrell’s peace of soul, his undisturbed friendship, study, prayer 
and character which were true goods in his life. He was not 
ambitious for fame or notoriety. He did not seek controversy but 
rather sought a calm understanding of controversial issues. 
Tyrell hoped for a synthesis between the essentials of 
Christianity and the scientific criticism current in the theological 
debates among the so-called Modernists. He noted that scientific 
truth and religious truth must each be examined by the principles 
of their respective disciplines. When he attempted this synthesis he 
realized that the discord initially caused was much less than 
expected. According to Maude Petre this book is a calm 
“examination of the value of this life, a study of its relation to the 
next.” 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
In the Roman Catholic tradition, Avery Dulles notes that 
Modernism has influenced much of the existential phenomenology 
and theological empiricism since Vatican II.32 As traditional 
religious and classical images do not fit well within contemporary 
culture, so also the terms of the Modernist movement have lost 
their significance for the contemporary social and cultural context. 
However, the Sacramentum Mundi notes that, “It is undoubtedly 
true that the inner religious experience is an essential element of 
the life of the spirit and in many cases the psychological source of 
faith.” 33 Similarly, as I have argued elsewhere, “Theologians of 
the Modernist movement sought to express theological truths in 




modern images and terms. They introduce new thresholds of 
interpretation, i.e., phenomenological understanding.” 34 
Our time is unique and requires a creative religious 
imagination in order to read the signs of the times. A certain liberty 
of language and expression is required and religious belief ought 
not to impose a specific language that might frustrate a broad 
acceptance of religious issues in Christian interpretation. A certain 
liberty of language and expression gave rise the Roman Catholic 
Modernism that broke open the reified religious systems of 
Catholic theology of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Religious belief has shifted from the medieval synthesis achieved 
by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica. In our time 
religious belief has evolved toward a holistic understanding. The 
holistic understanding makes the study of religious belief infinitely 
more meaningful than the dichotomous nineteenth-century 
outlook. In holistic understanding one does not separate the human 
person into parts and faculties, into inner and outer, into personal 
and private. We are all of those things at once and much religious 
belief consists in bringing our multi-faceted composition into a 
meaningful unity. Religious belief is actualized in the interiority of 
the person’s own subjective consciousness, but lived in a concrete 
situation. Traditionally, ascetic or mystical theology encompassed 
much of what we mean by the term religious belief. Given the 
current emphasis on community, culture, anthropology and 
language, religious belief must broaden its scope to account for the 
presence of these disciplines as well. A contemporary 
understanding of religious belief can, in fact, achieve that simply 
by allowing these disciplines to be part of the current debate 
thereby allowing a transcendent principle present within these 
disciplines to become present to our consciousness. 
There is living tradition, which continues in theological 
debates, only if a present belief is oriented toward a future belief. 
The perpetual death and rebirth of differing forms of belief in the 
Catholic faith are part of the living tradition of the church. The 
phenomenological approach to religious belief allows individuals 
to express their deepest desires and to be nourished by important 
traditions. Further, the phenomenological approach provides a new 




opportunity for dialogue concerning the issues of religious belief. 
The primary theological contribution of Roman Catholic 
Modernism is precisely its emphasis on the value of tradition, or 
pre-modern forms of thought, as having significance for our time. 
As Christianity spread during the patristic period there was debate 
about the manner and the extent to which Hellenist philosophy 
could be used to understand the revelation by Jesus of Nazareth as 
the Christ. The early Patristic teachers were deeply divided over 
the extent to which Hellenist philosophy should enter the Christian 
understanding. Some, such as Tertullian (ca. 160-225 CE) and 
Tatian (ca. 120-173 CE), were passionately opposed to Hellenist 
philosophy and culture for fear that such an influence would 
adulterate the gospel. Others, however, such as Justin Martyr, (ca. 
112-165 CE), and Clement of Alexandria, (ca. 150-212 CE), 
endeavoured to understand the message of the gospel with the 
assistance of Hellenist philosophical concepts. Notwithstanding 
Tertullian’s protestation, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” 
Christian understanding eventually accepted Hellenist 
philosophical terms. Henceforth, philosophy, even that which 
originated with the pagan Aristotle and Plato, would become an 
ancilla theologiae, that is, an understanding of philosophy as a 
helpful servant to theology. Such openness to Hellenist 
philosophical concepts, opposition in the Patristic period 
notwithstanding, find expression once again in the medieval 
Scholastic philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. He synthesized 
Aristotle’s ethics, cosmology and metaphysics within the Catholic 
message. Bold use of notions borrowed from traditions outside 
one’s own, while not without controversy, has always been a living 
part of the Catholic theological tradition. This is being felt today as 
theology critically engages postmodern religious belief. 
 
 





Essays on Faith and Immortality 
Publication date 1914 
 
This book was published by Maude Petre after Tyrrell’s death. 
She wrote, in the Introduction that Tyrrell possessed a “strange 
self-detachment” that fitted him for addressing “a problem which 
some of us can hardly endure to face.” She arranged these essays 
in light of Tyrrell’s intention of addressing the problem of faith 
and immortality. About these essays she wrote: They “will serve 
their purpose if they do what their author was always satisfied to 
do, namely to give the lead to some other mind which can carry the 
search a little further.” 
 
A Reflective Commentary 
 
I suggest that faith, hope and charity reflect the divine element 
in the “Catholicizing” spirit of Christ as understood by Tyrrell. The 
virtue of faith is the response-movement to an invitation from God 
which presupposes a capacity to relate to another. God is the object 
of faith in the sense that recognizing God, as a subject, sets up a 
relationship between two individuals. This relationship is a 
dynamic one which means that it has the capacity to grow and 
develop. But the act of faith proves nothing as to the existence of 
God. The setting up of this faith relationship is a subjective 
experience that admits of no verifiable scientific investigation. 
Further, the faith response initiated by one individual inspires the 
same response in others of like disposition. Thus, faith has a 
communal dimension. This attitude of faith is not an additive to the 
individual’s experience. It is not acquired externally. The attitude 
of faith arises within the conscious experience of life. The act of 
faith characterizes what it means to be a human in community. An 
individual human being grows physically, psychologically and 
spirituality. The faith response brings about some positive change, 
some positive movement or some development in the individual. 
Thus, an individual who is faithful toward the person of Christ and 
the Church ought to be able to show signs of being a Christian. 




That is by being a forgiving individual, by being a compassionate 
and generous person. 
The tension between the classical notion of faith and the 
contemporary notion of faith is not unhealthy. The individual’s 
experience varies from generation to generation and from culture 
to culture. Thus, it is reasonable that one’s faith relationship varies 
from generation to generation, culture to culture. A philosophical 
variation in understanding is possible since the Christian faith is 
not wedded to any given cultural form, any more than it is found as 
a pure essence, devoid of a concrete social context. Christian faith 
can be cast not only in the traditional philosophical concepts but 
also in the emerging philosophical concepts that an evolving 
human experience creates. 
Hope is connected to faith. Christian hope is directed properly 
to its object God, as revealed in the person of Christ. Christian 
philosophers and theologians have held this view since medieval 
times. Hope is eschatologically determined as humans seek to 
create a better future in life. In some manner the future may be 
realized in the present time since hope is exercised in knowledge 
of a future goal. I argue that what we hope for is in the process of 
being realized in the present moment. Those who live in hope 
encourage each other, strengthen each other, and affirm each other 
against hardships and any apparent meaninglessness of life. The 
individual and the community live in the expectation that their 
hopes will be realized. There is an element of risk in life which the 
individual cannot avoid. Life is not certain. Hope offers no 
philosophical certainty, but offers venture. One who lives in hope 
lives as if living in knowledge and thus is not subject to the 
criticism of credulity. Hope gives a meaning and a purpose to life 
that prevents an unhealthy attitude from overtaking an individual. 
Thus, the healthy individual finds hope uplifting and motivating. 
Charity is unmotivated love understood from a psychological 
perspective. That is, charity does not seek to act for requited love, 
but is an evoked response because one has been loved by another. 
From a theological perspective, do for others what God has done 
for you. I suggest that Christians, ideally, do not need to “do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you.” Charity encourages 




the overcoming of evil, as God has shown us in Christ, and allows 
for the divine presence to be revealed. 
It is urgent that theologians find creative ways to offer what is 
unique in their interpretations to the world. If true religion does not 
feed the mind’s craving for the mysterious, the wonderful, and the 
supernatural, then the mind will feed on any superstition that is 
offered it. Historically, the church and formal religion were the 
institutions that provided the context for religious belief to be 
understood and expressed. As institutions that formally guided 
behaviour in the pre-modern and modern era began to collapse, the 
issue of the need for the church to reinterpret itself became 
critically important. To carry the argument a step further, 
contemporary philosophers, whether they are Jewish, Christian or 
Muslim, have a personal responsibility towards their respective 
communities of faith. This responsibility applies to their effort to 
produce a reasoned and scientific philosophy that is capable of 
supporting the faith of their traditions. It is more responsible for 
the religious philosopher to promote a reasoned and scientific 
philosophy, than a cultural folklore. A reasoned philosophy is not a 
new philosophy given that its roots extend back to the ancient 
thinkers. However, a reasoned and scientific philosophy is new in 
that it has produced the natural sciences that characterize 
Modernity. My mind follows that of Alister McGrath who has 
probed the manner in which the natural sciences have “become the 
ancilla theologiae nova.” 35 A reasoned and scientific philosophy, 
as an ancilla theologiae nova, is not confined to a particular 
revealed faith tradition but is susceptible of interfaith dialogue. I 
do not suggest, however, that this personal responsibility need 
apply to religious philosophers of other, non-revealed belief 
systems or traditions. 
Among all the disciples available to assist me, as a theologian, 
in the critical task of collaborative reflection, a scientific 
philosophy is a most fundamental one. Psychology, sociology, 
history anthropology, etc., make a contribution to the task but it is 
only philosophy that is in a privileged position to undertake this 
task of theological collaborative reflection. The task of the 
scientific religious philosopher is not to look for a polemic 




opportunity to prove a doctrinal point. Rather, the task is to express 
and to clarify the reflective experience of faith vis à vis scripture 
and tradition. Such is the primary task of the Hebrew, Christian 
and Islamic scientific religious philosopher, or theologian. After 
Vatican II the Roman Catholic Church deliberately attempted to 
enter conversation about religious meaning in the public forum 
with other faith communities. Vatican II recognized that the 
corporate Church is to serve all humanity in its religious, as well 
as, secular life. This recognition raised the problem of the Church 
re-defining its religious philosophy in the public forum. It needed 
to move from a religious philosophy that had, to a great extent, 
become Romanesque folklore to a scientific philosophy. 
Specifically, beginning from the 19th century onwards, the Roman 
Catholic Church left its classical corporate self-understanding to a 
significant degree and took on a personal self-understanding. 
Within Christendom this change in perspective initiated the so-
called Modernist Movement, being a “phase of the liberalising 
movement in the Church of Rome by the Civiltà Cattolica, and it 
may be accepted: Modernism may be described as the shape which 
religion takes in the mind of the modern as distinct from the 
mediaeval man.” 36 
Modernism yields its greatest insights when viewed as a 
scientific philosophy which expressed itself within Roman 
Catholicism. In its self-understanding, the Roman Catholic Church 
had to abandon the theoretical notion that a single cultural norm, 
originating in ancient Rome, could continue to determine its self-
understanding in the tradition of Hellenistic philosophical thinking. 
Thus, it was that the Roman Church accepted the 
phenomenological philosophical approach that through a variety of 
cultures an active self-understanding could be developed through a 
process of a scientific religious philosophy, or which is the same 
thing, through the process of dehellenization. Modernism, within 
the Roman Catholic Church, was condemned and had no future 
among Catholic religious philosophers. However, history suggests 
otherwise. It appears, to the benefit of the Church, that positive 
insights have been gained from the scientific scholarship of 
Modernism. These insights have been introduced into Western 




theology by Catholic philosophers. One such insight, hoped for by 
Tyrrell, was that subjectivity and inter-subjectivity in philosophical 
methodology would replace ideological theory and ratiocination as 
primary in philosophical thought. However, much contemporary 
Catholic religious thinking seems to be developing away from such 
scientific religious philosophical thinking. Today, a particular 
philosophical understanding characteristic of an earlier age, Roman 
scholasticism, seems to be supplanting Vatican II’s 
phenomenological approach and favouring a return to a Hellenized 
and traditional understanding and abandonment of a 
phenomenological understanding. 
In contemplating revelation, scientific religious philosophers 
do not confine themselves to any pre-given philosophical system. 
Our scientific philosophical reflections arise out of an intellectual 
world of the inner human experience that is disclosed within 
various cultures. In a similar manner, pre-scientific cultures, such 
as the folklore cultures, but not of the Jewish, Christian or Islamic 
traditions have mythologies that explain and interpret their inner 
human experience.37 Christian scientific philosophy differs from 
Christian ideological philosophy in that it takes human experience 
as its primary subject matter, not doctrine and dogma. This means 
that, as subject matter for a scientific religious philosophical 
interpretation, historical texts and records in themselves are 
secondary. In short, scientific religious philosophical reflection is 
an activity of reflection on personal experience, not on the 
intellectualization of ideals or values. 
In a scientific religious philosophy, I transcend the boundaries 
of my creaturely existence in such a way that I become more truly 
and holistically myself. Such a transcendental encounter is not for 
mystics only. Rather, it is the centre of life for all Christians. I 
come to know my self as I come to know any other person, that is, 
through reflection. This requires a perpetual scientific 
philosophical effort in the first person.  
The variety of ideologies identified by philosophers and 
theologians as ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic traditions 
may develop into transnational ideologies. True, one culture can 
adopt the traditions of another. However, in a religious context 




there will be conflicts among groups of the faithful, that is, 
parishes and local churches which confess a particular ideology. 
When cultural variety is ignored, as has been the case in our 
historical, political and religious context, an expectation about a 
future global union of churches, patterned after a world civil 
government, seems logical to some philosophers and theologians. 
Note that I say a global union, not unity, of churches. Such a civil 
universal expectation, however, results in a negative effect on the 
development of my Christian theism. In our present circumstances, 
were this global union of churches to come about the governmental 
apparatus of the churches would no doubt resemble the dominant 
secular culture of the West. The problem in accepting the Western 
cultural pattern for government of the Churches is, as I understand 
it, that Western secular education, being technologically driven, 
has given me a specialized, but incomplete, knowledge about the 
world. 
This knowledge is not conducive to a full development of my 
Christian theism. This specialized knowledge lacks an 
encompassing view of the world. Bits of information from 
contemporary science and technology can only become appropriate 
knowledge after an individual has processed them mentally to 
produce a coherent whole, or a holistic unity. Phenomenologically 
understood, this holistic unity is greater than the sum of its 
individual parts. As Henri Bergson (1944), notes. To form an idea 
of the whole of life cannot consist in combining simple ideas that 
have been left behind in us during the course of evolution. In short, 
I suggest that contemporary science and technology have only re-
packaged scholasticism, as it were. They have not revealed a 
holistic unity, in the process. Further, given that individual bits of 
information in themselves do not constitute a holistic unity, a 
world union of churches constituted by bits of information would 
lack the totality of the shared beliefs, values, symbols, language, 
history and customs that would properly constitute a holistic 
community of churches. 
A universal governing ideology cannot be constructed 
phenomenologically. Phenomenologically, an understanding of 
others, their civilizations, and ways of life is to be discerned 




through dialogue and through the examination of relationships 
without the interference of preconceived ideas and without the 
presumed superiority of the Western scholastic philosophical and 
theological tradition. Our common humanity suggests, to many 
philosophical and theological thinkers, the need of a universal 
humanitarian understanding to designate the human being. Victor 
Segesvary (2003) notes that universalism is a millennia-old dream 
of humanity dating from the time of the Stoics. The desire for 
universalism was clearly evident in the medieval Church and is 
reflected in modern ideologies like Marxism and liberalism. It 
should be remembered, however, that universalism does not denote 
universality. 
Universalism is a scholastic philosophical term, whereas 
universality is a phenomenological philosophical term. Thus, 
normative universalism is an ideology, which reflects the moral 
and ethical principles arising from within a particular culture. It is 
highly doubtful that a universal moral and ethical principle, 
applicable to all peoples and in all times, can be drawn from a 
specific civilization. To attempt such universalism would be a 
philosophical, as well as political, mistake to my mind. Further, 
such normative universalism would be a misnomer, as well as a 
deficient state of affairs, comprised of nothing but a local 
community’s mores. In contrast, given my intent to develop a 
proper future for ecclesial governance and a proper future for the 
development of Christian theism, what I must come to understand 
is a humanitarian universality that is holistically discerned and 




The foregoing discussion has led me to the following 
conclusions with respect to the theological reconstruction and the 
phenomenological understanding of my Christian theism. In the 
status quo, the government of the Church, both Eastern and 
Western, must move from a classical ecclesiastical methodology, 
that is, from a scholastic architectural methodology, to a 
phenomenological ecclesial methodology. A phenomenological 




ecclesial methodology is an organic methodology. As such, it 
enables a proper and appropriate development of theism by the 
Christian faithful appropriate to our times. The main obstacles to 
organic ecclesial governance are the various architectural and 
political authorities, civic ideologies that determine modern 
individualistic cultures. The uncritical acceptance of these 
conditions, impede the proper development of Christian theism. 
By way of further example, territorialism, not territoriality, is a 
product of an architecturally constructed civic ideology with its 
roots in classical Hellenistic philosophy. In contrast, territoriality 
has its roots in phenomenological philosophy. The same 
observation may be made about the notions of Catholicism and 
Catholicity, nationalism and nationality, historicism and 
historicity, humanism and humanity, communism and community, 
etc. as noted above.  
Territoriality, as describing a community, encompasses a 
notion which includes more than the community’s mere physical 
location. It embraces the linguistic, cultural and historical 
understanding and self-understanding of a community. A 
phenomenological methodology accounts for this shift in 
understanding from “-ism” to “-ity” in philosophical thinking. In 
adopting a phenomenological methodology, with respect to 
governance, dioceses in the future cannot be determined externally 
by territorialism, but they must be constituted territorially. That is, 
they will be constituted through an experience of individual 
residence, upon a physical space on the earth, which embraces the 
effects on the individual of linguistic, cultural and historical 
relationships. The experience of relational residence in physical 
space will constitute the diocesan framework of organic 
governance, replacing the ideological architectural government 
that presently exists. Dioceses that are constituted out of an 
experiential cultural framework, that is, organic governance, and 
are not dependent on physical or political territory, will be directed 
by governors who lay claim to a limited, or contextual sovereignty 
based on their communities’ existential interpretation of 
experience. Nor will such organically governed dioceses be bound 
by theoretical or political borders. In light of the above, then, my 




understanding of Christian theism is constituted within a 


















THE LAST PHASE, 1890-1918 
 
 
A Point of Departure for My Future of Belief 
 
 
The above sub-title, “A Point of Departure for My Future of 
Belief,” introduces “My Personal Process of Constructing 
Christian Theology” given below and to Tyrrell’s contribution to 
my theological and spiritual development. “Can metaphysics 
present a reliable point of departure for a future of belief,” I had 
asked myself. I had been taught, throughout my academic 
formation, that it can. Is science a better approach, I wondered. 
Could science be but a different type of philosophy rather than the 
non-philosophical discipline many understand it to be? Many 
contemporary thinkers accept that science has dethroned religion. 
And thus in the realm of knowledge, religion for them, enjoys little 
more than a folklore status, or than an uncritical mythology. In the 
PhD thesis of Leslie Dewart entitled “The Development of Karl 
Pearson’s Scientific Philosophy,” which he defended in 1954 at the 
University of Toronto, I found the beginning of an answer to my 
questions. Dewart wrote: 
The question is…that science has done away with the 
worn-out, outmoded forms of religion, and yet has done 
nothing to fill the vacuum it has created. For man, by his 
very nature, needs a religion yet, after the advent of 
science, nothing has come along to fill this need. The 
dilemma of science and religion is not then to be solved by 
a choice between the two, but by the harmony and 
integration of both.  




I suggest that the harmony of religion and science may be achieved 
in answering the question, “what is man, or, what is humanity?” To 
this question I answer man, or the human being, is a creature that 
can approach God. Is the better approach to God through religion 
or through science, I wondered, each of which describes the human 
condition? Or, is the better approach to God through the unity of 
both constituted such as to reveal the participation of God in 
humanity’s life? This, to my mind, is the central problem of 
contemporary Western philosophy. The tension between religion 
and science began shortly after the fall of Constantinople when 
Greek literature introduced into the Latin world a new way of 
thinking which was critical and not disposed to the acceptance of 
uncontested theological opinion. Science is concerned with the 
application of experiential truth to the practical life, that is, science 
is an ethical approach to life. Within the Catholic philosophical 
tradition, ethics is associated with human action, that is, with what 
humans are or are not to do; whereas morality consciously involves 
that which is divine and which can unconditionally give to and 
demand of its creatures. 
Science cannot answer the “why” question in interpreting the 
experience of movement or growth. Science merely puts our 
experience in order, or which is the same, explains the “how” of 
movement or growth. Thus, science is one method of approaching 
our experience. Other methods exist, as well, i. e., the 
metaphysical, the poetic and the mythical, but only science gives 
knowledge through the human classification of our experience. 
There can be no knowledge, in this view, apart from the human 
mind, since knowledge is a product of the human mind. In short, 
unless there is a “knower” there is no “known.” It is possible for 
there to be an “unknown reality” however, incapable of being 
known by a human being. That being the case we must remain 
agnostic concerning knowledge of this realty.  
Science when it looks to the past is a description, when it looks 
to the future it is a belief; it is never an explanation that answers 
the “why” question. In the Western context, until the Age of 
Enlightenment, knowledge was ultimately directed towards 
religious ends, that is, philosophy was to serve theology. Today, 




however, for science to fulfill its proper role it must be free of 
religious or theological methodologies that are not true to the 
experience of the scientific methodology. 
Reconstruction in Western theism is a theological process that 
characterizes the modern era. Its task continues and many of the 
issues raised in the process remain unresolved, or even understood, 
which accounts for much of Western theological indifference. The 
last phase, or a point of departure for a future of belief, has its roots 
in the Nouvelle Théologie which came to prominence in the mid-
20th Century in France. Taking my queue from the Nouvelle 
Théologie, I abandon the scholastic approach and embrace a 
phenomenological approach. I explore the reconstruction of 
Western theism as a departure point for my future of belief. To aid 
the reader in understanding my thinking I cite the historical 
understanding presented by Alexander Dru in his The Contribution 
of German Catholicism. His historical understanding of the 
theological developments as they unfolded in Germany and France 
provide, to my mind, a basis for a future of Western theistic belief. 
He writes: 
The last act of the reign of Pius IX began with a double 
event: the declaration of infallibility, and the loss of the 
Papal States; on the one hand the affirmation of the 
spiritual power, on the other the collapse of the temporal 
power. In terms of foreign policy this meant a state of open 
conflict between Church and State, more violent in France 
but better known under the name it received in Germany, 
the Kulturkampf. The limits had been reached: the policy of 
relying on the “thesis” [that Christendom still existed] 
could not have been carried further, and Leo XIII turned to 
the “hypothesis” [the self-criticism of religious motives]. 
This does not mean that the acts of his pontificate were 
inconsistent with those of Pius IX. Leo’s aim was that of 
his predecessor: to maintain the claims of the papacy, and if 
possible to extend its power. The thesis was not for one 
instant lost to sight, and until the year of his death Leo XIII 
thought in terms of pope and emperor, of Christendom. But 
by temperament, training and experience he was a 




diplomat, and in the place of open conflict he desired not 
merely co-existence but collaboration as implied by the 
Concordats….For in the situation as it now existed, it was 
becoming increasingly clear that the choice was no longer 
between conservative and liberal Catholicism, but between 
accepting the situation and rejecting it – between opposing 
it (on the grounds of the thesis, or hypothesis) or accepting 
it: between political Catholicism and religious Catholicism. 
For the first time the seriousness of the position in 
which the Church found itself was being taken seriously. In 
the place of the customary lamentations about “the evils of 
the age,” which placed the whole responsibility for the 
decline of religion and the dechristianization of France on 
the Revolution and its consequences, on the Freemasons 
and the Republic, the grave weakness within the Church 
were taken into account and the salutary principle of self-
criticism was applied by a few. Moreover, this was done, 
not from a political point of view, and in pursuance of 
immediate political results, but from religious motives. 
What followed was not a change of policy, but a revolution, 
which has little to do with the ‘liberal Catholicism’ of 
Lamennais, Lacordaire and Montalembert. Furthermore, it 
was not conducted by politicians, or by men interested in 
the main in social and political questions, but by 
philosophers and poets, by historians and men of 
letters….This was the real, cultural background to the 
failures of the nineteenth century, which self-criticism 
revealed. Since the seventeenth century the Church in 
France had relied on political power and influence, 
wherever possible silencing opposition, and finally 
isolating itself from the nation. Since the end of the 
seventeenth century Catholicism had abandoned the 
cultural sphere for the political in which it was possible for 
a time to maintain the ‘thesis’ that Christendom still 
existed, and consequently it had ceased to be a missionary 
Church inside Europe, hoping to preserve a static position, 
its ‘power,’ by making Concordats the basis of its 




policy….This attitude cut the Church off and isolated it, 
and its authoritarianism became a sort of caricature of 
spiritual authority. 
The ‘crisis’ of which Blondel wrote was caused by the 
unavoidable reversal of the Roman policy, necessitated by 
the situation which could now no longer be denied. This 
reversal was finally and officially proclaimed by the 
Lateran Treaty, and by the condemnation of political 
Catholicism under the name of the Action française in 
1926. The aims set before the present Council [Vatican II] 
by John XXIII are those which emerge naturally in the new 
situation: both ecumenism and aggiornamento imply the 
abandonment of power in favour of a purely religious 
policy. It is often implied or asserted that the ‘crises’ which 
began in 1890 and exploded during the pontificate of Pius 
X centred on the Modernist controversy. That was no doubt 
the impression given at the time, and moreover it suited the 
Action française and its supporters in France and in Rome 
(of whom Cardinal Merry del Val was the most important) 
to make the problems raised by the Modernists the central 
questions. This distracted attention from the political 
issues, and moreover it made it possible to stamp any form 
of opposition to political Catholicism as ‘Modernism.’ But 
in retrospect (and without for a moment minimizing the 
importance of Modernism) Claudel’s diagnosis points to 
the central issue: the crisis was the ‘tragedy of a starved 
imagination’ – or, in Blondel’s terms, the tragedy of the 
‘whole man’ le tout de l’homme, cut off from the cultural 
sphere. It is of course possible to write the history of the 
period in negative terms, to group events and interpret them 
as a series of heretical movements – in the social sphere the 
Sillon condemned in 1909; in the theological sphere 
Modernism, condemned in 1907; in the philosophical 
Laberthonière’s condemnation in 1913. And this has been 
so effectively that the real leaders of the Catholic 
Renaissance, the creative writers and thinkers and 
historians have been ignored or treated in isolation. But if 




instead of rehearsing the mistakes or possible mistakes 
which were made, the positive achievement of the period is 
taken as the criterion, the work of Blondel, Péguy, 
Bremond, Claudel and others stands out in its real 
proportions. It then becomes possible to see that Claudel 
was right in saying that the ‘crisis’ had culminated in the 
nineteenth century, and that the ‘crisis’ which occurred 




















No one in philosophy is ever completely original, 
obviously. The idea of philosophical originality is 
practically a contradiction in terms, if one takes the terms 
literally, since philosophy already presumes a history. An 
original thinker places himself within an existent current of 
philosophy and, cannot not presume something of the 
history of the attempts of his predecessors even in his own 
originality.39 
 
I discuss my personal process of re-constructing a Christian 
theology in this book from a subjective point of view. Therefore, 
by reconstructing a Christian theology I mean engaging 
dialectically with the world which I have inherited and the world 
that I subsequently create for myself. Within this process, in fact, I 
am in dialogue with two subjective worlds, as it were. The world 
that I have inherited is subjectively interpreted; the world I 
construct is subjectively created. In the process of constructing 
Christian theology, I contrast contemporary theological 
understanding to traditional theological understanding that has 
become inordinately influenced by Hellenistic, or Ancient Greek 
philosophical understanding. Leslie Dewart’s efforts at 
dehellenization are an attempt at a new philosophical construction 
within theological knowledge.40 
Drawing on his insights, I focus in my process of constructing 
a Christian theology on the way my belief has been shaped by 
relational, as opposed to merely ideological, forces. Hence, “roles” 




as opposed to “goals” are the subject of my attention. My 
theological construction is based upon human insight that has 
come into being with the advent of society and, in particular, 
Western or Hellenistic society. That is to say, my process of 
theological construction is one that is critical of copula verb “to 
be.” For, “to be,” means to be some-thing joined to, or connected 
with, an underlying reality. My investigation of contemporary 
theological construction reveals that a particular dichotomous 
philosophy has mistakenly become regarded as necessary for 
theology. This philosophical error may be corrected by viewing 
understanding as a unified phenomenological activity, not as a 
dichotomous scholastic or theoretical activity. This is a difficult 
task for the contemporary thinker and requires effort because “the 
intuitive view is that there is a way things are that is independent 
of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief 
about how things are that is objectively reasonable, binding on 
anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence regardless of 
their ideological perspective.” 41 
The personal process of constructing Christian theology arises 
within my experience. My experience may be negative or positive 
which in turn affects my understanding and subsequent social 
construction. Reflecting upon my experience negatively, I may 
conclude that my civilization is dying. Things are not the way they 
once were. Life is decadent. The Christian moral values that I once 
acknowledged publicly are challenged within my society and often 
appear as conflicting opinions. Media headlines suggest to me that, 
world destruction is near given the perpetual state of war and 
conflict in which my world seems to be engaged. The moral 
principles that formerly held my life together seem to be 
disintegrating as the traditional supports of my social life are 
undermined. 
Reflecting on my experience positively, the world goes on 
because I, like the ordinary person, am cheerful and optimistic. 
The ordinary person believes that life is good and he or she feels a 
part of a larger rhythm of creation despite its apparent corruption. 
Ordinary people do experience an abundance of the life in which 
they participate. Often this optimistic attitude is expressed in 




religious life, that is, vowed life, or in a secular and respectful 
attitude toward life and creation in general. Devout people often 
experience religion as one reality among others, such as the 
philosophical, political and economic movements that have 
characterized human development throughout the ages. 
Scholarship and the process of theological construction are not 
ends in themselves. Each is a human intellectual and social 
activity. Neither produces any philosophical system. Neither is 
permanent but only supplies temporary points of view that are 
contingent upon the cultural context of the thinker. Once I have 
given meaning to my experience I have entered the realm of 
philosophy. Philosophy is an activity reserved to humans living in 
society. Brute animals, because they lack a philosophical sense, 
cannot attribute meaning to their experience. The members of 
human societies and institutions intentionally relate themselves to 
the events within their common experience. The simpler stages of 
anthropological and cultural development, such as, tilling, 
fabricating tools and shelters, along with the rearing of the young, 
become established as habitual intentional activities as time goes 
on. These stages, in due time, gave rise to new experiences and 
subsequent interpretation that demanded further re-adjustment 
within a given society, or within the institutions of that society. 
Thus, the human world continually becomes more philosophically 
complicated in its theological construction and this affects the 
religious lives of its inhabitants. 
In the process of constructing a Christian theology I do not 
suggest a metaphysical ideology as the basis for theological 
construction. Theological construction is rooted in philosophical 
wonder that is prior to the formulation of any metaphysical 
ideology. Philosophically speaking, the Psalmist has it right, I 
believe. “What is man that you should care for him?” 42 Further, 
the inquiry into human nature is prior to the inquiry into divine 
nature. As I come to realize the need to possess my own soul, as 
Augustine did, I seek God in which to rest my soul.43 Existentially, 
I am linked to an earlier age in theological construction and I 
recognize that present day problems are simply the logical 
outcome of the so-called Modernist Crisis of a not-so-long-ago 




age. In the process of my theological construction, I relate then to 
experiential issues arising out of theological Modernism and not 
speculative philosophical problems. 
My Christian theological construction is based upon God’s 
revelation within the ecclesial context. The ecclesia is formed by 
being “called out” of the general social context or cultural milieu 
in response to the divine summons. This being “called out” in 
response to the divine summons gives Christian theological 
construction its unique character and capacity to express God’s 
revelation. All social institutions are the means whereby 
individuals are able to relate to each other. Family, government, 
church, agriculture, trade, etc. are examples. The decay or the 
growth of any one of them will have a corresponding affect on the 
individuals making up the social institution. Theological 
construction cannot take place in a self-defensive and self-isolating 
context characteristic of decay. Rather, it needs a constructive and 
supportive context characteristic of growth. The faith of 
individuals, I included, needs the instruction and nourishment 
provided through divine revelation. In undertaking this reflection, I 
am not intending a devotional or pious work, nor do I intend an 
exclusively professional academic and philosophical one. 
However, I do intend to address the educated and theologically 
interested reader. I do this inspired by Leslie Dewart and through 
the original insight of George Tyrrell. In short, constructing a 
Christian theology is my attempt at satisfying my intellect where 
traditional understanding seems to have failed.  
My contemporary Christian theological construction is based 
on my “style of life,” not upon the natural or supernatural schema 
of traditional theological understanding. Christian theological 
construction must occur in a specifically religious context. Further, 
theological construction is proper to human beings, who cannot 
help but discover themselves as being Christian or non-Christian. 
Theological construction discloses the humanitarian characteristics 
of self-discovery that distinguish the thinking animal from the 
brute animal. Thus, Christian theological construction possesses its 
own special worth with respect to knowledge and human action. 
Christian theological construction, engaging emotion, feeling and 




intuition, enables me to encounter that which is transcendent as my 
consciousness extends beyond my sensible experience. The 
purpose of investigating George Tyrell’s “avant-garde” theology is 
to direct my efforts towards formulating a proper process for 
Christian theological construction thus avoiding the distortions of 
past ideology, of present fantasy and, uncritical “new age” thought.  
Christian theological construction presumes that a relationship 
between God and humanity has actually been established and has 
taken on the special features of unique personal self-discovery with 
distinctive insights. Therefore, I must exercise critical discernment 
in forming theological constructions based on my experience. 
Christian theological construction meets my personal needs when: 
1) its purpose is related to my actual experience, 2) its purpose is 
discovered within my social relationships, 3) its purpose is to serve 
a further definite practical function of spiritual growth. My 
personal process of Christian theological construction starts with 
the established relationship between the risen Christ and me. I 
must undertake the task of theological construction and may do so, 
without error, only insofar as I have learned to enter the corporate 
faith reality of the ecclesia. Since my process of Christian 
theological construction needs to be set within the proper 
background, before discussing the characteristics of my 
contemporary theological construction, I shall present the 
understanding of theology that has influenced this work. 
 
An Understanding of Theology 
 
Theology began as a professional activity with the formation of 
the universities. Initially, it was undertaken informally within the 
ecclesiastical context, the vocational guild, as it were, and its 
purpose was to serve the Church in establishing and formalizing 
her doctrine and dogma. However, I understand theology to be an 
evolving social construction which clarifies doctrine and dogma. 
My current intent is to re-think theology within an ecclesial context 
of faith and do so outside the ecclesiastical guild of an earlier 
theological age. As I use them, the phenomenological term, 
ecclesial, reflects relationships as constitutive of the Christian 




communal life. The classical term, ecclesiastical, refers to the 
historically conditioned structure governing the Christian 
community. The doctrinal and dogmatic formulations extant in 
most ecclesiastical institutions are founded on a classical 
theological ideology. As a consequence of this foundation over the 
centuries there have been various rhetorical accretions that have 
clouded reflection in theology. These accretions developed into 
theological understandings that did not always relate well to 
contemporary experience of theologians. Therefore, the theological 
reflection that I undertake today in an ecclesial context must differ 
from the reflection that took place in a traditional ecclesiastical 
context.  
The way in which I conduct my contemporary theological 
reflection outside of the theological guild is through critical 
reflection. Critical theological reflection itself is a unique human 
activity and an innate capacity of the human mind. Critical 
reflection engages theologians, philosophers and psychologists to 
probe into the depths of the mind to disclose an “other.” Critical 
theological reflection discloses the believer’s best efforts at 
constructing an authentic Christian anthropology. As a believer, 
this authentic Christian anthropology discloses an understanding of 
human life and purpose that enables me to evolve as a member of 
humanity. Thus, critical reflection in theology has three 
humanitarian purposes for me. The first is to relate humanly to my 
actual experience. The second is to disclose truth as a human 
relationship. The third is to grow spiritually within an ecclesial 
community. 
In this section I reflect upon my experience outside the 
traditional philosophical mould of an ecclesiastical guild. I have 
rejected the form of expression of an earlier Medieval Christian 
theology, influenced, as it is, by out dated Aristotelian categories. 
Such theology lacks resonance with contemporary cosmology as 
has been noted by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.44 In addition, by 
reflecting outside the guild, I have avoided the accretions of 
disputed ecclesiastical, political and power-related issues that 
emerged in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation but which 
today are no longer relevant. Thus, in my context I have opened 




the way for new reflections and theological investigations. In 
reflecting on my religious experience I take seriously the notion 
that the Enlightenment period, which began in Europe, has 
introduced by virtue of its epistemological, historical, and 
evolutionary development legitimate expressions of religious 
experience. 
In North America, given its historical and theological 
patrimony, theologians are intellectually connected in their 
thinking to problems traceable to the philosophical and theological 
context prevalent in pre-Victorian England. During this time and 
well into the reign of Queen Victoria (1837—1901), England 
remained virtually isolated from Continental and theological 
philosophical thought. However, a critical examination of English 
philosophical and theological texts of that period reveals some 
influence of German thought. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, Rationalism was in vogue 
in England and on the Continent. In his review of religion in the 
Victorian era, Elliot-Binns distinguishes two strains of rational 
thought that were hostile to religious, and in particular Christian, 
experience. One train of thought was the overt and complete 
rejection of the whole Christian system, typical of France. The 
other train of thought, which was typical of Germany, tolerated 
Christianity but gradually reduced it to a mere caricature of its 
former self.45 The existential and less rationalistic Germanic 
thought, that later evolved into phenomenological philosophy 
under the influence of Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl, 
resonated with the English theologian George Tyrrell. Although he 
died before any formal development of the phenomenological 
school of thought in England, his thinking was definitely heading 
in that direction.  
In constructing my philosophical position, I follow closely the 
existential way of thinking noted by W. K. C. Guthrie. He reminds 
his readers that philosophers do not think in a void. In fact, their 
thoughts are products of three interrelated factors: their 
temperaments, their experiences and, their reading of previous 
philosophers all of which make up their life-world.46 One of the 
pioneers of the phenomenological and existential method of 




philosophy was Edmund Husserl. He taught that philosophers can 
reflect on all experience, inasmuch as it presents itself to 
consciousness, according to a clear methodological framework 
since all knowledge appears within a complex series of cultural 
contexts. Phenomenological philosophers urge that the world of 
experience takes precedence over the abstracted and theoretical 
world of the sciences. Langdon Gilkey notes that, from a personal 
perspective, the public task of the theologian is primarily the 
analysis of life with regard to its religious issues and dimensions 
and, only secondarily as an analysis with regard to economic, 
sociological or psychological dimensions, although each of these 
has a religious basis and ground.47 As a phenomenological 
philosopher and theologian I conclude, therefore, that an existential 
reflection on constructing Christian theology in the contemporary 
world, although undertaken individually, is not a private enterprise. 
My theological style falls within Jeff Astley’s understanding of 
doing “ordinary theology,” which pays attention to personal 
insights arising out of experience and theological thinking. 
Ordinary theology takes place outside the traditional guild. 
According to Astley, original theology is rarely done. He maintains 
that theological thinking today is often undertaken as the study of 
other people’s ideas, which is not a self-critical reflection on one’s 
own particular religious experience and ideas.48 Although modern 
theology may have begun in the academy, it cannot remain in the 
academy as John Apczynski has shown.49 Theology given its 
purpose, must address the questions, problems, and data that arise 
within all aspects of human society. The thought of any theologian, 
(and in the final analysis this means anyone trying to understand 
his or her own ultimate meaning), emerges from the lebenswelt 
(lifeworld) of the individual. A theologian’s lebenswelt forms the 
existential milieu, in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s sense, of the 
cultural, social, and religious context of life. 
Theologians are continually searching for new and meaningful 
ways to reflect upon religious experience outside the traditional 
theological guild. In my approach to theological understanding I do 
not consider the legacy of the past as hardened and dead with 
respect to the present any more than I ignore the lives of those 




critical thinkers who have shaped the past. Although they are 
physically dead, from the perspective of a contemporary 
theological construction, the legacy of those critical thinkers who 
shaped the past continues to shape the present. Their theological 
legacy is significant not by virtue of ecclesiastical endorsement, 
but by virtue of its relevance to our present time and experience. 
Theological construction within an ecclesial context, which is 
greater than the mere guild, must be in dialogue with artists, 
musicians, novelists, poets, psychologists, and always with the 
Scriptures. Here, I draw on Marshall McLuhan’s insight: 
One thing which characterized the finer arts—poetry, 
painting, music—areas with which we’re all familiar—for 
more than a century, but certainly for the past century, has 
been a continued insistence on their relevance to daily 
living. There has been quite an impressive chorus of urgent 
requests in all fields that we take seriously the arts as basic 
social factors of enlightenment and guidance and training.50 
It is quite clear then, to my mind, that my contemporary 
theological construction must incorporate aspects of the human 
temperament, experience, and understanding of both past and 
current philosophers and theologians within the Western cultural 
context. Eventually, in the course of history the initial diverse 
theological understanding of the ecclesia developed into a uniform 
theological construction that became normative for the Christian 
life, particularly in the Western Church. For example, the two early 
diverging and distinct schools of theology, the Alexandrian and 
Antiochene schools, came into being over Christological 
controversies. These schools reflected their respective cultural 
understandings. As well, these schools were never homogenous 
groups. As M. C. Steenberg notes, homogenous schools never 
existed in the concrete sense. Theologians within them may have 
managed to encompass convergent themes and approaches, but 
they never developed a uniform system.51 The presence of these 
schools indicated that diversity was an integral aspect of the 
ecclesia’s theological construction for some time after the death of 
the apostles. As the ecclesia evolved it interpreted its experience 
and theologically constructed itself-understanding in different 




fashions. Between the Judaic and Hellenistic world-views, a 
theological rapprochement prepared the way for a new articulation 
of the Christian life. No longer was the imminent return of Jesus 
the main focus for reflecting upon the Christian life. An 
interpretation of the Christian life, which drew heavily on 
Hellenistic philosophical ideas, subsequently cast the Christian life 
in a new light. And in turn, this affected theological construction 
within the ecclesia. The influence of Hellenistic philosophical 
ideas continued in the Church for centuries. As Brian Gaybba has 
pointed out, the various schools of reflection on the theological 
construction of the Christian interior life were developing long 
before the Reformation.52 The Franciscans and Dominicans were 
the two dominant schools, among others, which had developed to 
advance the theological perspectives of particular religious orders. 
In the Middle Ages, a change in the structure of theological 
understanding concerning the Christian life came about with the 
controversial introduction of Aristotle’s philosophy. The 
Scholastic method of interpretation, influenced by Aristotelian and 
Platonic thought patterns, was the best tool for intellectual 
argument in that age. Aristotelian and Platonic thought patterns 
were presented within Thomas Aquinas’s theologically constructed 
synthesis of Aristotle’s cosmology and the Christian message. One 
consequence of his theological construction was that Thomas 
relegated spiritual or mystical theology to a subdivision of moral 
theology. Eventually this theological approach became dominant in 
the Roman Church. To my mind, it is significant that through the 
acceptance of Aristotle’s cosmology, Christian theology produced 
a very “act-centred” message that was never fully realized, nor 
theologically understood, by the faithful. Consequently, reflection 
on the Christian life developed into various static legalisms. Sandra 
Schneiders points out that this theologically constructed medieval 
synthesis held together until the middle of the 20th century, when 
the culture-shattering events of the two world wars, the 
technological revolution, various liberation movements, an 
explosion of knowledge and, the rapid developments in the 
humanities of philosophy, psychology and other social sciences, all 
together brought this comprehensive hold of the medieval 




synthesis on the Christian mind and imagination to an end.53 Out of 
this new non-scholastic milieu diverse theological ways of thinking 
have been constructed and now re-shape the hermeneutic of 
Christian theology. 
My critical reflection on the Christian theology often leads me 
to ask: Is church membership a prerequisite for doing theology? 
Can I do theology outside of the revelation in Christ? Concerning 
theological construction in the ecclesia some Christians saw and, 
continue to see, the Invisible Church contained within the Visible 
Church. Yet, the Invisible Church certainly is not identical or 
coextensive with the Visible Church. That there are many souls 
within the Visible Church that do not belong to the Invisible 
Church and, that there are many souls not within the Visible 
Church that belong to the Invisible Church is still a thoroughly 
orthodox and common saying,” notes Baron von Hügel.54 Thomas 
Foudy has written of Tyrrell’s notion of the relationship between 
the Visible and Invisible Church: “For him the invisible Church 
here on earth does not extend beyond the limits of the visible 
Church except so far as faith extends; it includes all those who give 
God primacy in their lives.” 55 Nevertheless, in undertaking a 
critical reflection on the Christian life as ordinary theology both 
theologians and religious philosophers need to “enchurch” their 
thinking somehow. They need to do this in order to theologically 
construct the historically called community. 
Love for God provides motivation for studying theology, 
which is historically, for Continental theologians, at least, 
tantamount to schooling in the Christian interior life. Coming to 
understand the things of God out of love is the beginning and the 
root of all theology. In short, theology is not merely an academic 
programme of studies arising within the medieval universities. It 
has a practical dimension. Brian Gaybba reminds us that the 
phenomenon of Liberation Theology is rooted in love. “With the 
sure instinct given by Love, liberation theology has ‘whether it 
realizes it or not’ retrieved the classic Augustinian tradition that 
only love gives full understanding of the things of God.” 56 From 
the foregoing understanding of theology, how do I relate truth to 
love? Truth is the result of God’s love for those in the world and, 




of those in the world whose practical learning is with the school of 
the Christian interior life. Further, practical learning within the 
school of the interior life invites the seeker to experience God’s 
love outside of his or her inherited religion. Seekers of God’s love 
are more likely to feel their relationship with God than to 
understand it. The Spirit of Christ helps seekers feel the truth and 
then formulate it. Once formulated, the Spirit of Christ helps all 
feel their way deeper into this formulated truth. Thus, the lex 
orandi, the rule of prayer, is more deeply understood as a product 
of the community’s, not the individual’s, experience. The lex 
orandi is the theological construction of the community’s 
unfolding of the Christian interior life, not of an isolated and 
individual experience. Theological construction arising from 
community’s experience presents the criterion for theological truth. 
But, theological construction does not set the criterion for private 
judgment. For Christian life to be healthy and bear fruit it must 
unfold within a community and be connected to the theological 
construction that constitutes the community’s life. That is, the 
community is to be the school of the Christian interior life. 
 
My Personal Approach to Theology 
 
My personal theology does not consist in a doctrinal or 
dogmatic representation of ecclesiastical corporate ideas. My 
personal theology is a reflective account of my thinking as affected 
by the reading and digesting of texts of other theological 
philosophers. To illustrate my personal theology, I offer below a 
selection of reflections arising within an existential theology. 
Initially, my personal reflections seemed new to me but I soon 
discovered that similar reflections had been undertaken by William 
Gladstone (1809—1898) and George Tyrrell (1861—1909). Even 
though I am writing in 2012, William Gladstone, George Tyrrell 
and I share the same theological cultural context. 
During my undergraduate years at the University of Toronto, 
Leslie Dewart had introduced me, in his lectures, to the theme of 
dehellenization in philosophical and theological thinking. When I 
encountered the writings of William Gladstone and George Tyrrell, 




I discovered that in their own context they had embarked on this 
theme, in its broadest sense, which had not yet been named within 
Western theological and philosophical circles. In my personal 
approach to understanding theology, contemporary theologians, 
whether they are Jewish, Christian or Muslim have a personal 
responsibility to their respective communities. Since I am included 
among them my theological thinking must be carried on within, 
not without, my community. Our communities mediate the 
experience of believers as they pass on to future generations the 
fruits of their theological reflection. In order for a theologian to be 
credible today critical reflective thinking is a requirement. I 
undertake critical theological thinking within an existential 
philosophy, which is a dehellenized philosophy. In addition to any 
interfaith theological discussion on revelation among Jews, 
Christians and Muslims, there is the further issue of critical 
reflective collaboration among all theological philosophers 
including those of non-monotheistic religions. Critical reflective 
collaboration is a clear, consistent, professional and systematic 
sharing of insights into the personal, but not private, experience of 
God. The sharing of such insights constitutes existential 
(dehellenized) theological discussion. Philosophy, among all the 
disciplines available to assist me in this task of constructing 
Christian theology in the contemporary world, is the most 
fundamental one. Since it critically expresses my personal belief, 
philosophy is to be preferred to other disciplines, such as sociology 
or psychology, in assisting me. Philosophy is my personal, but not 
private, way of evaluating experience, whereas psychology and 
sociology are corporate ways of describing religious experience. 
The more recent disciplines of psychology and sociology as “soft” 
sciences share scientific clinical roots. G. E. Newsom notes the 
advent of psychology as a new discipline bringing its own 
significance to the world of science. He writes: “There is another 
development of science, that of psychology, and especially of 
religious psychology, which has come in with the new century and 
which may well be as characteristic of this century as physical 
science was of the last.” 57 This is not the case for philosophy, 
which is the more ancient discipline. Existential philosophical 




questions, not idealist questions, preoccupy me today. Existential 
philosophical and theological ways of thinking are the means by 
which I evaluate my experience as a member of a community. 
Even so, I do not have all the right questions to ask much less all 
the right answers. 
To my mind, within an existential theological understanding, 
what is said of Christian theology may be said, inter alia, of Jewish 
and Islamic theology. An existential theology transcends cultural 
expression and denominational religious traditions. That is to say, 
an existential theology is not reserved to those theologians who 
officially represent the organized and visible community. Further, 
existential theologians recognize that not all members of the 
visible church belong to the invisible church and vice versa. 
Christian existential theology, by transcending denominational and 
official corporate interests, is less likely to become enslaved to an 
institutional and political ideology. The primary locus of an 
existential theology is the word of God addressed to the believer in 
community. Not being a member of either of the Jewish or Islamic 
faith communities, I do wonder to what degree this transcendence 
of denominational, (or sectarian), interests occurs in their 
theologies. Existential theology is an abandonment of the classical 
model of traditional theology, which has often been a polemical 
promulgation of doctrine and dogma. To my mind, should 
theological thinking fail at transcending institutional interests and 
become a mere servant of the visible corporate community, and not 
serve the believer, that failure is tantamount to a living death for 
both the community and believer. 
Existential theology must be distinguished from religious 
studies, which is a separate discipline in its own right. As a distinct 
academic discipline, religious studies has its roots in the Western 
academic thinking characteristic of the mid to late 19th Century. In 
its pedigree are listed philology, linguistics, historiography, 
anthropology, ethnology, archaeology, and sociology. In the 
contemporary academic context, religious studies seeks to describe 
religious belief within cultural terms and always with a concern for 
the corporate community. Theology, however, in the contemporary 
philosophical context and having been influenced by the 




Enlightenment and Reformation, seeks knowledge not from an 
ideological and rationalistic perspective but from an existential and 
phenomenological perspective. However, despite this evolution of 
theology with respect to its role, for most professionals it is still 
perceived to be a service limited to persons preparing to minister in 
a particular religious community or corporate faith tradition. 
Within my philosophical perspective, however, I recognize the 
primary role of theology as rendering a ministerium verbi divini, 
that is, a service to the Word of God. That is, revelation, in the full 
sense of word and sacrament, is beyond mere service to the 
institutional community. 
Theology is nothing less than an understanding of personal 
religious experience, individually or collectively. As a reflection 
on experience, theology is not merely a theoretical discipline. As 
merely a theoretical discipline theology would be reserved to 
reflection on the Church’s corporate catechism, or on the 
ideological doctrine or dogma of a faith tradition. Reserving 
religious reflection to the Church’s catechism, or ideological 
doctrine or dogma, is more properly the domain of religious 
studies than theology. From an existential perspective, data that are 
the loci for theological reflection are not reserved to the classical 
philosophical disciplines studied by professional academics. 
Rather, all experiential data collectively provide a locus for 
theological reflection. For me as an existential theologian, there are 
certain existentialia, or existential experiences that constitute my 
life. They are fear, despair, love, hope, suffering, death, happiness, 
and guilt. Yet, these existentialia present only one part of my 
existence, the human part (a partis hominis). They are not of God’s 
part (a parte Dei) which is also present to my existence. Thus, as 
an existential theologian questions arise for me that require 
responses from each part, God’s and mine. 
Scripture, not the confessional idea, is the primary and 
necessary datum for an existential Christian theology. This is not 
to deny that confessional corporate ideology, known as tradition, 
provides important theological data. However, confessional 
corporate ideology is secondary. To my mind, the former 
metaphysical attempts seeking to prove that God exists are futile in 




the contemporary world. Further, such attempts at a metaphysical 
philosophy that are not rooted in experience tell us nothing. The 
task of the existential theologian is not look for a polemical 
opportunity to prove a doctrinal point. Rather, the theologian’s task 
is to express and clarify the experience of faith, vis á vis scripture. 
In contemporary Western culture the Christian life may be 
legally private but it is ethically and morally public. Christian 
theology, therefore, is ethically and morally accountable within the 
public forum. The accountability of Christian theology, which 
brings about social transformation resulting in a new social 
construction of the public forum, arises from the personal 
relationship between the individual and the public community. My 
Christian duty, that is to say Christian response, is not restricted to 
certain aspects of ecclesial life. My Christian duty is nothing less 
than the response to my total ecclesial life that is shaped by the 
larger public community. 
After Vatican II the Roman Catholic Church deliberately 
attempted to enter a conversation with other faith communities 
about religious meaning in the public forum. The theologians of 
Vatican II recognized that the Church is to serve humanity in its 
secular life. This raised the issue of the Church re-defining her 
theology in the public forum. Writing before Vatican II, William 
van de Pol, a convert to Roman Catholicism, notes that the role of 
serving humanity in its secular life was already part of the 
Church’s practice although not necessarily evident to all. 58 Today, 
Christians are conversing, both intellectually and spiritually, with 
many other religious communities, both Christian and non-
Christian. From the late 19th century onwards the Catholic Church 
left, to some degree, its classical corporate self-understanding, and 
took on a contemporary personal self- understanding. To my mind, 
this change in perspective was significantly promoted by the so-
called Modernist thinking within Roman Catholicism. In 
understanding herself from an existential perspective the Church 
thus abandoned the previous notion that a single cultural norm, 
originating in ancient Rome, could continue to determine her self-
understanding. 




In the contemporary North American context, the corporate 
Church seeks to dialogue with partners holding common beliefs 
wherever they may be found. Tolerance, as many of us know, is a 
significant virtue in the North American civic tradition. However, 
in addition to its positive effect, tolerance may have a negative 
effect as well. Too much variation in public discourse fragments 
civic culture. It appears to me that a workable discourse in the 
public forum is lacking due to an exaggeration of tolerance. As 
well, too much variation in belief makes dialogue among partners 
extremely difficult. Further, the effects of an inordinate tolerance 
extend beyond national boundaries. Global Westernized culture 
lacks an accepted theological language about meaning, value and 
experience in order to host a successful discourse in the public 
forum. As a result, I personally am not as influential in the public 
forum as I may have been in the past. This leads me to conclude 
that Christendom, my previous ecclesiastical context, is dead or at 
least dying. Even though I have been born into an ecumenical 
context, that has been well established and can easily be 
distinguished from a secular context, I still experience the lack of 
an ecumenical public language. This lack of an ecumenical public 
language makes discussions with non-Catholic Christian 
theologians difficult for me. To add to this difficulty, science, 
which sets the standard for contemporary secular discussion, does 
not give me answers to my deeper questions of meaning. I 
conclude that my deeper existential questions need to be answered 
by philosophers and theologians and not scientists. 
The Western intellectual tradition, from the Hellenists 
onwards, reflects a notion of an individual and collective 
humanum. This humanum is that which constitutes humanity. In 
the West it has been traditionally the goal of society and 
government to enhance this humanum, through a humanitarian 
social construction of civic society. Only in the recent past has this 
goal been challenged by the concept of a sovereign individualism 
taking preference over the notion of an individual and collective 
humanum. However, in Christian existential theology, the idea of 
individual sovereignty is not an absolute goal. Rather, an 
individual must be subordinated to God in some manner. Gaudium 




et Spes: The Pastoral Constitution on the Church, of the Second 
Vatican Council taught that there is inherent value and meaning in 
the lives of individuals in this world. Gaudium et Spes notes that 
Christian humanitarianism is founded on the human dignity that is 
ultimately grounded through God’s revelation to the Christian 
community, not to particular individuals. The imitatio Christi, 
then, as a particular way of life, is an embodiment of a personal 
and collective role in a community. It is this personal and 
collective role that expresses the humanum within the 
contemporary Christian community. Being an existential 
philosopher I have two tasks of equal obligation. The first is to 
interpret the corporate tradition of the faith to which I belong and 
the second is to interpret my personal experience within that 
corporate tradition. In my interpretation, I have noted that the 
theological language, once inordinately influenced by the 
Enlightenment, has ceased to be solely theoretical and rational. 
Secondly, I note that contemporary theological language is no 
longer separated from the human and social sciences. Theological 
language has become a personal expression arising out of the 
encounter with the social sciences. Thus, I no longer think of the 
social sciences in merely mechanistic terms, but rather I now think 
of them in humanitarian organic terms. 
In my reflections I have come to agree with the thinking of 
Sarah Jane Boss who notes that in Western society holiness and 
sacredness are not perceived to be that important in the public 
forum. As I noted earlier a phenomenological understanding is an 
alternative to a theoretical understanding. A phenomenological 
understanding, which is the same as an existential one, does not 
emphasize any acquisition of vocational skills nor does it 
emphasize the development of a more comprehensive 
understanding of the faith. The proper intent of an existential or 
phenomenological understanding is dehellenization of all things 
social which is nothing less than the conscious creation of the 
future of belief in holiness and sacredness in the public forum. This 
is a radically different view than the dominant one in our present 
North American culture. 




Originally, theological colleges were set up to serve the 
academic interests of the Churches in debating various theological 
opinions surrounding doctrine and dogma. However, today 
Christian theological education is being directed towards an 
existential formation of the whole person in having one’s mind 
conformed to Christ in such a way that praying and believing are 
one act. Given this role, Christian theology divorced from prayer is 
in trouble. A theology that arises from my experience of the 
Christian God contributes its own perspective to my conscious 
creation of the future of belief. Pastoral psychology and 
counseling, arising from an academic study of religion, address my 
emotional centre. However, neither psychology nor counseling 
addresses my spiritual centre. A pastoral theology rooted in an 
existential understanding, instead of psychology or counseling, 
helps me to order my life within the dimension of the sacred and 
what is holy.  
My philosophical reflections focus on the unfinished 
theological business of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, namely, the so-called Modernist Movement. This 
Movement arose from a tension between the personal and 
corporate theological understanding of Catholic theologians and 
the Church. It challenged the dominant corporate theological mind-
set of the time with its roots in the scholastic tradition. As a result, 
the so-called Movement was terminated by the ecclesiastical 
authorities and had an insecure future among Catholic theologians. 
However, many of the insights that have benefited the Church have 
arisen from the critical scholarship of the Catholic theologians of 
this period. One such insight is the attention paid to personal 
understanding, as opposed to corporate understanding, of the 
experience of the faith. Charles Healey notes Tyrrell’s contribution 
to the area of personal spirituality.59 Given that Catholic 
theologians today accept such insights of critical scholarship is, in 
fact, a fulfillment of the hope of the Modernist theologian George 
Tyrrell.60 However, to my mind the contemporary Catholic 
theological climate immediately prior to and since the election of 
Pope Benedict XVI seems to be developing away from such 
critical theological understanding. A particular denominational 




understanding, that is, the Roman, seems to be returning to take 
precedence over the ecumenical understanding of Vatican II. 
Unfortunately, such a move encourages a return to corporate 
understanding over personal understanding. 
 
The Existential Situation in Which I Find Myself  
 
I find myself in an existential situation that I have not made or 
designed, but have inherited. I know that I cannot stop its continual 
evolution. Also, I know that I am personally involved in its 
transformation. As a Western Christian, I live within the anxiety 
and tension that accompany the end of conventional Christianity. 
But within this tension, marking the end of conventional 
Christianity, I see indications of a new beginning leading to a new 
future. These indications signal the beginning of the process of 
dehellenization thus enabling the conscious creation of the future 
of my belief. 
Indeed, with this shift in my understanding, based on my 
experience, I now know that the true church is often to be found 
among those who have been excommunicated from the visible 
Church. Further, I acknowledge that those who are not members of 
the visible church may enjoy the benefits of her activity as a sacred 
and social institution. But, they are not direct sharers in her sacred 
activity. This does not mean to my mind, however, that those 
outside the visible limits of the Church are not members of the 
actual Church in some manner. 
As a Christian, I have no objective philosophy of my own, but 
must rely on that of the community. My personal philosophical 
reflections, however, arise out of the world of my subjective inner 
experience of my community’s objective philosophy. Similarly, I 
note that pagan religions have various philosophies to explain and 
interpret the experience of their adherents. As I noted above, 
Christian existential theology differs from Christian speculative 
theology in that existential theology takes human experience, as 
opposed to ideology, as its primary subject matter. Thus, given that 
as subject matter an ideological historical record is secondary, I 
consider the historical record as supplemental datum for reflection. 




In other words, my theological reflection belongs to the category 
of personal experience, not the category of an objective 
philosophical statement. 
In my existential encounter with God, I transcend the 
boundaries of my creaturely existence in such a way that I become 
more strikingly humanitarian. In other words, I understand myself 
holistically. Such holistic understanding is not reserved to mystics. 
Holistic understanding is at the center of Christian life. I have 
come to know God as I have come to know any other person, that 
is, through mutual self-giving. This required a philosophical and 
theological response from me as God was revealed to me. 
However, as a philosopher and as a theologian, I continue to 
respond to revelation differently. As a philosopher I respond to the 
existential probabilities offered through revelation, whereas, as a 
theologian I respond to revelation in the concrete phenomenon of 
existence. As with any personal relationship, the encounter with 
God defies objectivism, but not objectivity. I remind the reader that 
objectivism belongs to a non-dehellenized philosophy which 
preserves the past, whereas, objectivity belongs to a dehellenized 
philosophy that constitutes the present conscious creation of the 
future of belief. If I factor out the conscious creation of the future 
of my belief I am taking away that which is most strikingly 
humanitarian in me, that is, that I am greater than the sum of my 
individual parts. 
 
Theology and the Individual in Community  
 
In the balance of this chapter I present my thoughts on the 
secondary role of the ministerium verbi divini as noted above. 
Even though God is the primary one to be revealed in word and 
sacrament, I have reflected upon the philosophical response to 
revelation given by me in creating my future of belief. For many 
believers, our experience is that we are estranged from the religion 
we inherited. To my mind, this estrangement is due to the end of 
conventional Christianity and the death of the traditional concept 
of God. The cultural conventions developed and designed in the 
past to protect me from anxiety are inadequate and unsuccessful 




today. Often my experience leads me to conclude that God is not in 
his heaven and all is not well. In response to this state of affairs, 
new cultural safeguards are in the process of being created to meet 
my present needs. However, their success seems somewhat relative 
and somewhat limited. As an existential Christian philosopher and 
theologian I do not accept the Gospel message as merely a product 
of culture. Yet, the Gospel message is largely a product of the 
cultural milieu in which it was formed. Contemporary forms of 
cultural expression, conceptions, and customs, as well as 
Christianity’s spirit and mentality are rooted in the world of Greco-
Roman-Germanic civilization, which in turn has its roots in 
Hellenic culture. 
Cultural influences notwithstanding, Catholic theology supplies 
an intellectual embodiment and expression of religious experience 
evoked by the preaching of Christ. The preaching of Christ 
remains substantially the same in my cultural experience even 
though Christ and I are separated by two thousand years of cultural 
differences. I understand that the Church’s religious teaching must 
be in harmony with the mind of the age and that religion is an ever-
varying expression of individual spiritual experience. Yet, as a 
religion, Christianity is a doctrinal system and a collective 
construct of a human community. This doctrinal system is a 
construction, not of poetical, but of theological, philosophical, 
ethical, scientific and historical beliefs and conceptions evoked by 
the preaching of Christ. My critical reflective appreciation of 
theological construction leads to personal self-discovery, that is, to 
the act of seeing for myself and to the act of doing for myself. My 
task as a theologian is to clarify the intersubjectivity, which exists 
between God as subject and me as subject. My theological self-
discovery can have a subsequent effect on the moral and social life 
of the community. History shows that almost all of substantial 
philosophical and theological advancement has not been the work 
of officials, but rather of self-motivated individuals who have to 
some extent corrected and modified the system and often in 
opposition to officialdom.  
The philosophy, most suitable for me to disclose what I know, 
is phenomenology. As a philosophy of consciousness, 




phenomenology enables me to be conscious of my experience of 
the moment. Only with such conscious understanding can my 
Christian experience be meaningful. Phenomenology assists in 
discerning the meaning of me-as-subject created in God’s image 
and likeness. As a philosophy of consciousness, phenomenology is 
proper for the Catholic tradition of theological interpretation. 
Natural theology, on the other hand, is somewhat outside the 
Catholic tradition of theological thinking. Traditional Catholic 
theologians generally view natural theology more as a philosophy 
than a theology. This, it seems, was the mind of Tyrrell. John Root 
writes: “Before the critical year of 1900, Tyrrell wrote several 
articles in which he analysed the thought of popular evolutionists, 
criticized both Naturalism and Natural Theology.” 61 It could be 
argued that a special task of Catholic metaphysics, which does not 
belong to natural theology, but which is more properly 
phenomenological, is to show the grounds for the total 
consciousness of the world. Even so, Catholic theologians are not 
central to church’s life. The sensus fidelium is. The Church could 
get along without a professional theological class but it could not 
get along without the sensus fidelium. 
History reveals that controversial issues in religion introduced, 
by the new scientific knowledge in the late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries were, in the American Church at least, contested at the 
pastoral or practical level. To contest issues at the pastoral and 
practical level is characteristic of the North American 
temperament. However, the controversial issues in religion in 
France were contested at the level of theological argument, which 
is characteristic of the Continental temperament. These differing 
temperaments caused problems. One problem was that French 
thinkers could not understand the non-metaphysical or practical 
language of the North Americans. The French theologians tended 
to favour a theoretical and idealistic approach within their thinking. 
In England and the Continent, liberal Catholics attempted to 
integrate the new scientific knowledge within the teaching 
authority of the Church. The Modernists, it seems, attempted to 
reconcile the conflict between the Church and new scientific 
knowledge by altering the meaning of dogma and Church 




authority. Unlike Christian philosophy, Christian theology involves 
the process of Divine self-revelation. For the French and Italian 
Modernists, a life of philosophical study was natural and often 
followed upon the life of contemplative prayer. Many Modernist 
theologians accepted that a saintly life replaced a theological 
understanding of doctrine and dogma. In Tyrrell’s time there was a 
trend of professional theologians serving the doctrinal and 
dogmatic needs of the Church. That trend was, and remains, to 
serve the existential and practical needs of the individual in 
community. 
The existential and practical needs of the believing community 
notwithstanding, theological construction has remained to a large 
degree a theoretical catechetical activity in the institutional 
Church. A theoretical catechetical activity is not primarily an 
activity of the sensus fidelium. Theoretical theological construction 
has deep roots going back to inter-testamental times. The need to 
construct a theology in the Gentile-Christian Church arose from 
the belief that the conception of God as the Father of Christ and, of 
Christ as the Son of God, must be demonstrated positively as a 
universal truth of reason, even if rooted in pagan Hellenist 
philosophy. However, contemporary theology, as a human 
discipline needs to take into account all revealed religious 
experience, not just Christian. This is so since existential 
interpretive issues are common to all not just Christians. All 
believers are caught up in the existential transition to a new 
expression and practice of their faith. Classically, theology is a 
labor of reason that has recognized and included revelation as gift 
within the Jewish, Islamic and Christian perspectives. Still, it must 
be remembered that theology is an afterthought in our 
understanding. Tradition notwithstanding, from an existential and 
ecumenical perspective it matters little that Christian theology has 
developed in Roman, Reformed and Protestant terms. 
An existential theology, within contemporary Christian 
ecclesiology, presents a perspective that brings about an end to the 
antithesis between Rome and the Reformation. Thus, the new 
Christian outcome may be neither Roman nor Reformed. I find this 
an exciting possibility for theologians. Any new Christian outcome 




would require an existential posture similar to that recognized by 
Maude Petre who was sympathetic to the so-called Modernist 
movement and Tyrell’s views. Within such an existential posture, 
however, a Christianity understood without Christ becomes, not a 
new Christianity, but a new social ideal. Christianity understood 
with a mystical, but not historical, Christ is not a new Christianity 
but another religion. Further, Christianity understood with Christ 
as a moral ideal, not worthy of worship, is not new Christianity, 
but an adaptation of Christian teaching to other religious or ethical 
systems. It is clear that in Christian theology certain developments, 
such as the new cults, are not proper evolutionary developments at 
all. Rather they are substitutions for authentic Christianity which, I 
believe, has a better chance of survival in its classical form rather 
than in any new cultic form. Contemporary Christianity needs an 
existential theology in order to take on proper interpretive tasks in 
this age. Otherwise it has minimal reason for existence. In our 
contemporary context, with an emphasis on the needs of the 
individual, there is a danger that the Church, as a social 
community, may be understood as unnecessary for the spiritual 
life. This need not be the case. One must not forget that it is 
through the Church as community that new generations are 
introduced to the Christian faith. It must not be forgotten that one 
task of a theologian is the scientific analysis of public life and of 
communal experience with regard to religious issues. 
Tertullian, the Carthaginian theologian, who died circa 230 
spoke of the “natural man” simple, rude, uncultured, untaught and, 
not yet ruined by Greek education as being anima naturaliter 
Christiana. Tertullian invited his readers to return to their 
individual religious experience given that it is prior to any thought 
or theory. In this return they could explore the spiritual life in order 
to find the Christian route to God. Similarly, as a philosophical 
thinker, Socrates desired to help clarify the thinking of poets, 
politicians and whomever he met in market place, young and old. 
We know that Socrates did not initiate a system of philosophy. 
Rather, he took a rational approach to thinking. At this point, I note 
Kristina Stöckl’s timely observation. “Modern man is shaped by 
the Enlightenment, not only insofar as he has become autonomous 




in relation to preconceived foundations of a religious or traditional 
kind, but also to the extent that rationality itself has been 
recognized as not providing a foundation.” 62 Today, for many 
religious philosophers an existential issue is that God may have 
died in the mass culture of the nineteenth century. However, it is 
also an issue that God may return making use of new images and 
new symbols. Interpreting these new images and symbols is 
another task of the existential theologian. 
As a theologian, when I articulate these ideas and expressed 
them in a language that makes sense in contemporary Western 
culture, I discover that theology cannot do without a religious 
philosophy Thus, with the assistance of an existential religious 
philosophy the task of the theologian becomes a relative work. The 
work of the theologian today is conceived differently than in the 
days of the great theological systems, which dominated the 
Medieval universities. Developments in philosophy have always 
preceded developments in theology. Thus, there likely is no final 
philosophy or theology. To my mind, a primary task of the 
Christian theologian is to make known the great abiding truths of 
Christianity to a new generation. The principle merit and 
usefulness of theology is to satisfy the expectation of the Christian 
believer in this life. In attempting to satisfy the needs of the 
believer I make a distinction between the task of the theologian 
and the task of the spiritual counselor. The theologian answers 
needs arising within the revealed faith. The counselor answers 
needs arising within the human spirit. I am of the opinion, 
however, that an existential theology may address both within the 
context of a believing community. 
Contemporary social psychologists first ask in their inquiry: 
what were the experiences that presented themselves to 
unscientific minds? Secondly, they ask: what do these experiences 
that presented themselves signify for science? Theologians first ask 
in their inquiry: what are the experiences that present themselves 
via revelation? Secondly, they ask: what do those experiences that 
present themselves signify for theology? In their thinking 
theologians may give a conscious account of their experience using 
psychology, yet never fully understand their experience as 




psychologists. This is so since no two theologians construct their 
life-world identically but, each constructs it as a unique centre of 
interest and meaning. When I became aware of this unique 
construction of the human world, which is an illusion from the 
point of view of classical philosophy, that is, it is a psychological 
fiction I recognized it reflected a different, not contradictory, order 
to things. In this different order of things, constituted by personal 
interest and meaning, I recognized my individuality, not 
individualism, as subordinated to, yet dependent upon, the 
collective interest. As well, within my experience these questions 
presented themselves: has philosophy’s role been taken over by 
psychology? Will psychology fail as a philosophy? These are 
questions, I believe, which have been raised in the experience of 
many other contemporary theologians. 
History shows us that relatively few individuals have 
developed a profound sense of personal connectedness with other 
persons and their physical or external world. Gemeinschaftsgefühl, 
or the sense of universal interrelatedness interpreted as ‘social 
interest,’ has never been formally taught Catholic theological 
schools. Heinz and Rowena Ansbacher have made the annotation 
that this term, coined by Alfred Adler (1870—1937), despite 
alternative translations, is most adequately translated as social 
interest, denoting “the innate aptitude through which the individual 
becomes responsive to reality, which is primarily the social 
situation.” 63 Much of our history, even though lived through 
democratic and religious institutions, has been preoccupied with 
the conquest and exploitation of the external world. This conquest 
and exploitation of the external world included people seen as 
objects. Power and might have been sought through covert and 
overt, manipulative and competitive movements, which are 
exploitive. I can’t help wondering how different the world would 
be had our ancestors rejected Cartesian dualism, and opted for a 
holistic understanding. It often seems to me that my world has 
always been such that virtue is seldom rewarded. I often seem to 
lack the social interest of loving myself in ways that stimulate a 
charitable love for others. I seem to have philosophically 
victimized myself through an unworkable and false dichotomy 




between the temporal and spiritual, and between rejecting this 
world and loving God. To reject the world is impossible. However, 
I have come to realize that my spiritual life, or loving God, is such 
that it is not in the power of others to take it from me. 
The philosophical language of my inherited theological 
understanding is derived from intelligible concepts. By way of 
contrast, my phenomenological language inspired by revelation is 
derived from intuition. Theological construction is a perennial 
intellectual phenomenon proper to each person who is spiritually 
alive and active. It is to be remembered that theological constructs, 
like all theoretical constructs, are merely a roadmap for future 
speculations. At times, contemporary theologians think somewhat 
as poets. Such theologians translate their intuition of reality into 
concrete, heart moving images. However, following the mind of 
George Tyrrell, it is to the saints, and not the poetic theologians, 
that I attribute the growth of my Christian belief, which has been 
prefigured by the prophets. I do not understand “saints” to mean 
the canonized Saints of the Church who help me in my Christian 
belief. I agree with Maude Petre’s observation that Tyrrell’s 
appeal was to the mystical apprehension of the saint rather 
than to the closely-reasoned arguments of the theologian; 
and if, through all the vicissitudes of his mental career, he 
preserved a certain allegiance to St. Thomas, it was because 
he believed that at bottom the teaching of the great doctor 
was far more spiritual than the later developments of 
scholasticism.64  
As a matter of history canonized Saints have not always been 
the best moulders of the Catholic faith. Rather, the healthy growth 
of my faith depends upon the Christian Spirit which is present to 
various degrees in the lives of all the faithful. Thus, my spiritual 
progress reflects a deeper reading of myself and of reality. It is 
through transcending the illusion of an absolute being, by the 
judgments of my conscience that I progress spiritually. Thus, there 
is no progress in goodness, that is, the loving of what is right. 
There is progress only in ethics, the doing of what is right.  
As I passed out of childhood, physically, mentally and morally, 
I became an adult agent. Further, as adult agent, I am also an agent 




and co-creator, not merely a creature-agent. As co-creator I share 
in that divine agency which is consciously sympathetic and 
cooperative with the intentio naturae of which I am a part. Within 
the intentio naturae I distinguish between the “I” that lives as a 
separate human organism and the “I” that is a conscious subject 
and agent within the whole natural social process. Thus, not only 
am I capable of self-formation ab intra, but also am capable of a 
free self-adjustment to the universal good, ab extra. Theologically 
speaking, then, I am able to pass from the bondage of the law to 
the liberty of the Gospel. Many Christian mystics have felt the 
need to identify some invisible spiritual Church, some Communion 
of Saints, some mystical body of Christ, or organism of members 
manifesting the one and the same spirit in an endless variety of 
ways. This is not so in my case. But should this ever be the case 
that I become a part of such an invisible spiritual Church my 
separate self would necessarily communicate immediately with 
God. 
In the reformulation of my theological constructions, it is 
within the general life of the community that I am to look for that 
revelation of God, in Christ. For many people today the traditional 
concept of a transcendental God is quite dead, but there is a 
definite movement to encounter an imminent God. Related to this 
is a strong movement to find a language and a construct amenable 
to both secular humanists and representatives of various religious 
groups. Humanitarianism, as opposed to humanism, provides a 
possibility for such a language and construction. The spiritual need 
for an object of devotion and a frame of reference for my spiritual 
experience suggest an innate urge proper to all humanity to 
worship something. I worship through faith since factual certainty 
is impossible. I suggest that humanitarianism is the most suitable 
term to describe the advanced state of maturity in which I feel 
myself as an integral part of humanity sharing past, present and 
future problems. From a humanitarian point of view, the real 
question for me is: What does Catholicity do for my moral and 
spiritual elevation? The question is not: How many millions of 
people does Catholicism number among its adherents? The 
collective mind, sentiment, custom, and morality of a community 




or society, is an educational opportunity for my individual mind. 
My mind must be formed upon this communitarian standard, (the 
sensus fidelium in the case of the Church), which others must be 
able to recognize. In this way I am capable of critical reflection 
through which my community of faith may be improved and 
developed. To my mind, there is something in every individual, a 
sort of spiritual ambition and desire of true self-possession that 
makes one admire those who can suffer and endure life’s problems 
for the sake of truth and the principle love, or which is the same 












Note on Maude Petre. 
 
Maude Dominica Mary Petre was born 4 Aug 1863. Maude 
was born into an English Roman Catholic family related to the 
Dukes of Norfolk, the leading English lay Roman Catholic family. 
Although educated “at home”, Maude started writing theological 
works whilst still in her teenage years, was a founder of 
Westminster Cathedral, worked as a nurse both in England and 
France during WWI, was a prominent member of the “Modernist” 
movement within the Roman Catholic faith and befriended the 
controversial Jesuit priest, Father George Tyrell, whom she 
provided with a home in his last years and became his literary 
executor as well as publishing a major biography of his life and 
work. She also spent some time at the Abbaye de Pontigny in 
France when she was involved with the International Centre for 
Students. There are two major studies of her life’s work, “Maude 
Petre’s Way of Faith” by Clyde Crews and “Unresting 
Transformation” by Ellen Leonard. Both these deal with her later 
life and her own particular philosophy rather than with her 
background and personal life. In her day, she was perceived as a 
controversial figure, undoubtedly because of her association with 
George Tyrrell and other major figures in the Modernist 
movement, although she herself would probably have considered 
herself basically orthodox in her faith. She set out to question and, 
having questioned, seems to have found herself at peace with the 
Church, although, in her modest request that her funeral should 
avoid controversy, seems to have recognised that the Church may 
not have been at peace with her! Her Will asks “to be buried in 
Storrington churchyard in the plot belonging to me between the 
grave of Arthur Bell and the wall and I leave all religious 
arrangements to my Trustees desiring only that there be no 
controversy with religious Authorities in the matter and that all 
religious ceremony be omitted if objection be raised by the said 
Authorities. I particularly desire that my funeral shall be conducted 
with as little expense as possible and that only a small inexpensive 
cross shall be erected on my grave.” For an unmarried woman of 




her time Maude seems to have led a life of unprecedented energy 
and creativity. There is little doubt from her own writings that she 
was indeed in love with George Tyrrell, there is equally little doubt 
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